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J. INTELL PROP. LV
Using environmental law as a comparative model, this Article contends that
patent law needs to embrace afunctional 'bolitics, " which would allow diverse
constituendes to participate substantivey in the process offormulating polices
and resolving claims disputes. Three ky mechanisms-expanded standing,
acizen suits, and tranparen!'--that allow environmental law to maintain a
robustpartipation of diverse constituencies, are absentfrom patent law. Wbile
this can be explained by patent law's over-reliance on a bilateralpatent bargain,
a reinvigorated patent bargain must see the opportunities for third party
participation as integral Although recentpatent reform has embraced moderate
changes, which would incororate these mechanisms, any continuing reform must
be cognizant of thepredominant models-structuralpluralism and deliberative
proceduralism-so. as to maintain dariy as to the nature of third party
participation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Busy with the dishes, a mother glances over her shoulder at a child in a high
chair playing with Cheerios®. The child carefully selects each Cheerio and
throws it on the floor, thus enacting a rather common scene of early childhood.
Experts have theorized that this "play" is a key stage of early childhood
development where children use concrete objects, such as food or building
blocks, to learn perception behavior reasoning.2 These concrete objects are
generally termed "manipulatives." in the early 1990s, an emerging children's
' As an associate at a large firm from 1999 to 2004, I worked on matters associated with this
subject matter. All information related to this subject matter is derived from generally known
information. To ensure compliance with any relevant ethical duties, .all initial searches as to this
related subject matter were conducted in public databases and undertaken by independent
researchers with no prior knowledge of any related subject matter.
2 Jean Piaget, a Swiss biologist and noted theorist of early childhood development, argued that
children do not just passively observe and remember the things they see and
hear. Instead, they are naturally curious about their world and actively seek out
information to help them understand and make sense of it. They continually
experiment with the objects they encounter, manipulating things and observing
the effects of their actions. For example, we think back (without much nostalgia)
to the days when our children were in high chairs, experimenting with picking
up, squishing, pushing, rolling, dropping, and throwing their food as readily they
might eat it.
TERESA M. McDEvrrF &JEANNE ELLIS ORMEROD, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION 111
(lst ed. 2002); see also JEFFREY TRAWICK-SMITH, EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT: A
MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 231 (2d ed. 2000) ("Because pre-schoolers' thinking is still based so
much on perception and action, learning at this age requires an environment that is rich in sensory
experience and provides much activity with objects. Through active manipulation of play materials,
preschoolers gradually construct an understanding of the world.").
[Vol. 14:63
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literature market employed this theory to create a new product: the interactive
children's book.3 Interactive children's books sought to ensure that children
would use manipulatives to comprehend narrative in their early years. The
exploding market of interactive books was coupled with another development:
the direct marketing of consumer products like candies, cereals, and other food
items to young children so as to lock in their consumer preferences at an early
age.
Seeking to maximize on both of these trends, in April 1995, an early childhood
specialist named Deborah D'Andrea4 sought to patent a method of preparing a
book entitled "Book Including Candy As Part of the Pages."'  The patent
application described an invention that encouraged the reader to secure
accompanying candy to the individual pages of the book, thereby completing the
depicted picture.' Patent number 5,573,438 ('438 Patent) was issued on
November 12, 1996.v After issuance, Ms. D'Andrea began to pursue a series of
license agreements with various companies to sell products such as REESE'S
PIECES®,Jelly Belly Beans®, Goelitz® Gummies, and Necco® Candy Buttons.'
However, by 1998, Ms. D'Andrea faced significant competition. Simon &
Schuster, Inc., a major publisher in the children's literature market, introduced a
competing series of books known as the Cheerios Play Book Series.9 Unlike Ms.
D'Andrea's patented products, the successful Cheerios Play Book Series used
cereal as the primary food object, thus satisfying parental concerns about
nutrition. In response, Ms. D'Andrea filed a reissue application in October
1998.10 Her reissue application claimed that she had not drafted her claims
3 The market for interactive books exploded in the early 1990s. See, e.g., LISA ROJANY
BUCCIERI, WRITING CHILDREN'S BOOKS FOR DUMMIES 26-27 (2005) ("A novely book is one that
goes beyond just words and pictures on flat pages. It is often three-dimensional and always interactive
(interactive here meaning that the child must engage more than just his eyes in the experience).
From pop-ups to pull-tabs, from juggling balls to paper dolls, innovative novelty books can really
engage the imagination.').
' A former educational specialist, Ms. D'Andrea owns a small publishing company called
Playhouse Publishing Company, located in Akron, Ohio. Plqybouse Publishing Exhibits Creativity and
Courage, INDEPENDENTPUBLISHER, http://www.independentpublisher.com (search "Article Archives"
for "playhouse") (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
U.S. Patent No. 5,573,438 (filed Apr. 25, 1995) (issued Nov. 12, 1996).
Id. at col.1, 1.50-45.
7 Id. at 1.
8 SeePlayingByThe Book, VA.TECH. MAG. (2004), availableathttp://www.vt.magazine.vt.edu/
spring04/shorts.html (scroll down to "Playing By the Book').
9 The Cheerios Play Book series includes several different books. See general# LEE WADE,
CHEERIOS EL LIBRO DEJUGAR (2000); LEE WADE, THE CHEERIOS ANIMAL PLAY BOOK (1999);
LEE WADE, THE CHEERIOS CHRISTMAS PLAY BOOK (2000); LEE WADE, THE CHEERIOS
HALLOWEEN PLAY BOOK (2001); LEE WADE, THE CHEERIOS PLAY BOOK (1998).
1" U.S. Reissue Patent No. 37,362 (filed Oct. 22, 1998) (issued Sept. 11, 2001).
2006]
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broadly enough to include those items separately obtained by the reader (as
opposed to her initial application, which claimed only those items attached to the
book by a separate substrate)." Ms. D'Andrea also contacted Simon & Schuster
in 1999, claiming that the Cheerios Play Book Series violated the claims of the
'438 Patent; she was rebuffed.' 2 After a five-year examination period, the PTO
reissued a revised patent on September 11, 2001." The same day, Ms. D'Andrea
sued a number of companies, including General Mills, Inc., Kellogg, Inc., M&M
Mars, Inc., Simon & Schuster, Inc., HarperCollins Publishing, Inc., and
Charlesbridge Publishing, Inc., who she claimed violated the newly broadened
claims of the reissued patents.'4 Later, in June 2002, the relevant parties settled
their claims quietly, and we presume, amicably. 5
So, why do I tell this story? Ms. D'Andrea's patents are not "important"
patents in the larger sense. Her patents are not for pharmaceutical compounds
or genes; they are rather minor patents so far as it goes; indeed, the major parties
have already moved on to sell other types of products. The Cheerios® food fight
is worth examining because it reveals two trends that have driven recent debates
over intellectual property, including patent law. First, there has been an increasing
"propertization" of subject areas not commonly associated with the core subjects
protected by the relevant legal regime. 6 Second, as such propertization occurs,
the relevant products have become sensitive to a process that can be described as
multiplicity, which refers to the ability of multiple users to put any given
intellectual property resource to different uses. The interactive books are a good
example of these trends. First, an interactive book is not an engine machine. Ms.
D'Andrea and others' patenting of interactive books 7 took a relatively unknown
" Within two years of the issuing of a patent, a patent applicant may seek what is termed a
reissue patent if the patentee claimed either more or less than what was disclosed in the initial patent
application. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
1 Susan Decker, GeneralMills, M&M Mars Sued Over 'Nvibbk Me Books," BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Sept. 20, 2001.
13 '362 Patent.
14 Akron Publisher Settks Tasty Lawsuit, PLAIN DEALER, June 14, 2002, at Cl.
15 Id.
16 1 am using the term "propertization" to refer to, among other things, the process of an object
being claimed as a property. Margaret Jane Radin has contended that the term "propertization"
refers to the evolutionary and contested nature by which property tights are acquired and enforced.
See Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertitation and Its LeAgal Mieu, 54 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 23-24 (2006). Within the context of intellectual property, Radin has stressed that within the
realm of "information propertization" interested constituencies have seen the benefit of
overprotecting informational property at the expense of a robust public domain. Id
17 From 1995 onwards, at least nine patents or patent applications were sought on interactive
books. See Educational Systems and Methods Utilizing Edible Body Parts and Associated
Information Cards, U.S. Patent App. No. 0,213,877 (filed Mar. 24,2003) (disclosing a method of
informing individuals about the human body through the copious use of edible chocolate parts
[Vol. 14:63
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academic theory-Piaget's theory of manipulatives-and claimed a property right
that could implicate the preexisting rights of many users. These claims contribute
to a rapidly diminishing public domain, a subject that has been the subject of an
extensive academic debate."8 Second, the interactive books assumed a different
meaning within the political culture as examples of the ongoing commercial effort
to market to children.'9 In a sense, these books are like images superimposed on
attached to instructional cards); U.S. Patent No. 6,764,372 (filed Jan. 29, 2003) (disclosing a book
where the reader could place an attached marionette figure through each page of the book); Talking
Phonics Interactive Learning Device, EPO Patent 0,746,832 (filed Mar. .2, 1995) (relating to
interactive learning devices that had electronic circuitry triggered by the touch of the reader); Book
with Storage for Manipulatives, U.S. Patent No. 6,247,729 (filed Feb. 11, 2000) (disclosing a book
with a storage tube for manipulatives for used enjoyment of a book); U.S. Patent No. 6,234,534 B1
(filed Jan. 31, 2000) (disclosing a book with an elongated sliding toy attached to the back of the
book); Book-Toy Combination, EPO Patent App. 0,832,673 (filed Sept. 29,1997) (disclosinga book
with a toy character attached to the back of the book that could be manipulated by a child reader);
Interactive Book Assembly, U.S. Patent No. 5,951,298 (filed Apr. 10,1997) (disclosing a coordinated
set of instructional materials designed to be used by a parent and child with activities for developing
a child's skills involving indicia contained in the text of the book); Interactive Story Book Using
Stickers and a Method of Teaching, U.S. Patent No. 5,447,439 (filed on July 9, 1993) (describing a
story book assembly and method of teaching where the reader used stickers to complete a picture
partially disclosed by a previous image); Personalized Interactive Storybook and Method ofTeaching
a Reader a Desired Behavioral Pattern, U.S. Patent No. 5,387,107 (filed Aug. 23, 1993) (disclosing
a storybook with an illustration that could be personalized by the reader).
18 The extensive debate over the public domain has traditionally appeared in oppositional terms:
the public domain versus the encroaching demands of the property ownership. See Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Pubic Domain, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 354,363 (1999) ("The core difference between the public domain and the enclosed domain
is that anyone is privileged to use information in ways that are in the public domain, and absent
individualized reasons, government will not prevent those uses. The opposite is true of the enclosed
domain. There, government will prevent all uses of information unless there is an individualized
reason not to prevent a particular use."). Recently, a number of theorists have argued that resolving
these disputes solely in favor of the public domain creates distributional issues. Anupam Chander
& Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Pubfic Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2004); see also
PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 98 (2003) ("Our contention ... is that information feudalism is an
evocative way of describing the contemporary institutional push to redistribute property rights
unequally.').
19 See, e.g., Susan E. Linn, Sellouts, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23,2000, at 17 ("What makes
such ubiquity all the more disturbing is that children--especially young children--are even more
vulnerable to advertising than adults. Advertisers today know that preschoolers have trouble
differentiating between commercials and regular programming (and now that Simon & Schuster and
other reputable publishing houses market books to babies like The Cheerios Play Book or Sun Maid
Raisins Play Book, they're going to have even more trouble.).'); British Broadcasting Company,
Concern Over Food CbildMarkein& BBC NEWS UK EDITION, Apr. 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/health/4486923.shtm (detailing criticisms of the use of Cheerios Play Book to advertise Cheerios
to small children); Press Release, The Food Commission, Children Encouraged to Advertise Food
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each other. One image is of an ordinary book used by a mother to read to her
child; the second is of a marketing campaign that seeks to reinforce certain uses
of products.
These two trends are not mutually exclusive ones. Intellectual property
owners assert a stronger property right to combat the efforts of potential creative
competitors or multiple end users to use the disputed intellectual property. Each
of these trends has created interested constituencies that have begun to contest
the claims of owners who could once have easily relied on quiet acquiescence to
their ownership rights. The rise of organized constituencies highlights an
essential development that has resulted from these two debates: a politics of
intellectual property. James Boyle, analogizing this development to the
environmental movement has argued that a "politics," which he roughly defines
as "a conceptual map of issues, a rough working model of costs and benefits, and
a functioning coalition-politics of groups unified by common interest perceived
in apparently diverse situations," is apparent within the context of intellectual
property.'0 Such a politics, as defined by Boyle, has been typically associated with
the field of copyright.2' However, two key debates-the furor over the impact
of the patent regimes on developing nations combating the widespread outbreak
of AIDS2 and the controversy over the use of indigenous people's products by
To Themselves (Apr. 27,2005), available at http://www.foodcomm.org.uk/press-05-advertising.-
hun; W-rld i~Marketi ng .. N an Other.c S t 7 STAY FREE, hL-tttp:/l/lwww.stayircciluagaizic.
org/archives/17/worldview.html ("Baby books are now made to resemble Pepperidge Farm
Goldfish, M&Ms, Sun-Maid Raisins, Hershey's Kisses and other snacks. Some of the books-a joint
effort between food companies and publishers--suggest kids sort, place, and count using the
product.").
0 James Boyle, A Poktics of IntellectualProperty: Environmentaism For The Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87,
89 (1997).
21 id
' See generalA James Thuo Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in
U.S. Foreign Poig, 7 J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 267, 268 (2003) (arguing that extensive humanitarian
efforts in U.S. foreign policy results from attempts to legitimize its reliance on strong intellectual
property rights that interfere with developing nations' access to medical products); Rishi Gupta,
TRIPS Compliance: Dealing with the Consequences of Drug Patents in India, 26 Hous. J. INT'L L. 599, 605
(2004) (analyzing the impact ongoing compliance with TRIPS will have on India's pharmaceutical
industries); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, andAccess to EssentialMedidnes: A Long Way
From Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 27-28 (2002) (summarizing the history of the debates
surrounding barriers to drug access experienced by developing nations under an international
intellectual property regime); Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents, andAccess to iDfe-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 212-14 (2004) (examining the impact of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on developing nations' access to compulsory licenses); Michael
R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford,American Patent Poli, Biotechnology, andAfi'canAgriculture: The CaseforPoy
Change, 17 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 321,323 (2004) (analyzing the impact of the international intellectual
property regime on African agriculture); Anthony P. Valach,Jr., TRIPS: Protecting the Rights of Patent
Holders andAddressing Public Health Issues in Developing Countries, 4 CHI.-KENTJ. INTELL. PROP. 156
[Vol. 14:63
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major corporations' -has brought a functioning politics to patent law.
Moreover, Congress has repeatedly undertaken efforts to overhaul patent law,
partly in response to four major reports on its current state.24
Boyle's insight, however, does not fully explore what makes such a politics of
patent law possible: namely, an institutional design of the law that accords these
constituencies a full voice through key participatory mechanisms such as
expanding standing for organizational interests or the availability of citizen suits.
The use of these mechanisms reflects a key aspect of environmental law: the
relative ease with which it includes different constituencies in its decisionmaking
process. Perhaps, due to its initial origins in the political movements of the 1960s
and 1970s, environmental law has reflected the shift, more than any other legal
field, from what Richard Stewart has termed a bipolar administrative model,
where the agency essentially seeks to protect "recognized liberty and property
(2005) (analyzing the impact of TRIPS provisions on the efforts of developing nations to access
medical products).
2 See general# Erik B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process: Ana#ing TRIPS Participatory Guarantees
in Light of Protected Indigenous Rights, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 671 (2004) (analyzing
international guarantees of participation within the context of plant genetic resources); Shubha
Ghosh, TraditionalKnowkdge, Patents, and the NewMercantiism (Part I1), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
Soc'Y 885 (2003) (analyzing the issue of traditional knowledge within the context of strategic
intellectual property rights); Paul Kuruk, Protecting Folklore Under Modern Intellectual Propero Regimes:
A Reappraisal oftbe Tensions Between Individual and CommunalRights in Afica and the United States, 48 AM.
U. L. REV. 769, 775-76 (1999) (analyzing the adequacy of current legal frameworks for protecting
African folklore and proposing a suigeneris system ofintellectual property rights to protect indigenous
folklore); Symposium, Traditional Knowledge, IntelkctualPropeny, and Indigenous Culture, 11 CARDOZOJ.
INT'L & COMP. L. 239 (2003) (symposium issue on indigenous claims to intellectual property
resources);John L. Trotti, Compensation Versus Colonization: A Common Henitage Approach to the Use of
Indigenous Medicine in Developing Western Pharmaceuticals, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 367 (2001) (advocating
that a Common Heritage of Mankind regime could compensate indigenous peoples for use of their
medicinal knowledge); Michael Woods, Food For Thought: The Biopiray ofJasmine and Basmati Rice, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 123 (2002) (analyzing the inadequacies of TRIPS as to indigenous rights
utilizing the controversy over the biopiracy of jasmine and basmati rice).
24 See AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION, AIPLA RESPONSE TO THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT ENTITLED "A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY" (2004),
available at http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/IssuesandAdvocacy/Comments2/
Patent-andTrademarkOffice/2004/NAS092304.pdf;AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
ASSOCIATION, AIPLA RESPONSETO THE OCTOBER 2003 FEDERALTRADE COMMISSION REPORT:
"To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY" (2004), availableathttp://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/IssuesandAdvocacy/
Comnments2/Patentand_Trademark_Office/2004/ResponseToFTC.pd f; Committee on Intellectual
Prop. Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, Nat'l Research Council, A Patent System For the
21st Century (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at http://sdlls.nap.edu/catalog/10976.
html; FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/
10/innovationrpt.pdf.
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interests" to a multipolar administrative model that serves as a "surrogate political
process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in
the process of administrative decision. '25  Thus, environmental law offers
important lessons for patent law on how to balance the demands of multiple
constituencies against the potential property interests of the patent owner.
Beyond these administrative concerns, environmental and patent law share some
key similarities. Both patent and environmental law are areas where agency
decisionmakers have to confront considerable scientific uncertainty in assessing
desired outcomes. Moreover, both environmental law and patent law must
confront how to balance public demands of access to scarce resources.
Environmental law, however, is characterized by substantial contributions by third
parties in crafting policy.
I have adopted the title of this Article from Saul Alinsky's famous book, Rules
For Radicals: A Pragmatic Primerfor Realistic Radicals, which has served as one of the
preeminent books about organizing disenfranchised communities to assert
political power.26 While our ultimate "rules" may differ, I start in a similar spirit
with the premise that "citizen participation is the animating spirit and force in a
society predicated on voluntarism."27 Although other rules are possible here,2" I
argue that any institutional design of patent law must follow one key rule: diverse
constituencies must be allowed to participate in the outcomes associated with
patent decisionmaking. By allowing a range of third parties-competitors, public
interest organizations and even unaffiliated citizens-to participate in assessing
patents, these parties may be less likely to initiate later, more expensive challenges
to patents. Moreover, the entire patent administrative regime may acquire more
2 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1670 (1975). For a review of recent literature on different type of paradigms associated with
environmental law; see Eileen Guana, The Environmental Justice Mist: Pubfic Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 17-31 (1998). The bipolar model has been tested in
various ways: the challenge to a singular notion of "authorship" within copyright law, the research
activities of collaborative governmental and private efforts, and the growing popular recognition of
collaborative elements in creative arts such as the hip-hop movement. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. % 200-212
(2000); see generaly ROSEMARYJ. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998); THE RZA & CHRIS NORRIS,THE Wu-TANG
MANUAL: ENTER THE 36 CHAMBERS, VOLUME ONE (2004).
26 Saul D. Alinsky, RULES FOR RADICALS: A PRAGMATIC PRIMER FORREAISTIC RADICALS xxv
(1971).
27 Id.
28 A second project associated with this topic will examine the second "rule": intellectual
property must also embrace substantive norms that allow for internal judicial experimentalism
around public participation. This development, obviously, would mean a major shift in patent law.
However, judicial experimentation as to substantive internal norms, such as the public notice
function, indicates that the Federal Circuit may be becoming more sensitive to rights of multiple
constituencies.
[Vol. 14:63
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legitimacy in the eyes of relevant stakeholders and the larger public if more third
parties could participate in resolving disputes over patents.
In Part I of this Article, I briefly analyze the types of mechanisms
environmental law has used to structure decisionmaking and compare how patent
law has failed to support access to the same types of mechanisms. I continue this
inquiry in Part II of this Article, which analyzes two types of models that are
available to structure third party decisionmaking- (1) a structural pluralist model,
where competition between third parties is encouraged as the best mechanism for
resolving policy disputes; and (2) a deliberative democratic model, which borrows
theoretical insights initially advanced byJurgen Habermas, one of the preeminent
social theorists in democratic theory, who states that deliberative mechanisms are
the best mechanisms for resolving policy disputes. 29 While adopting either one
of these potential models will increase third party participation in patent law, I
contend that any patent reform must be cognizant of the differing consequences
of adopting a particular model and should, therefore, sufficiently distinguish
between the two models throughout the process of reform.
II. A PARTICIPATORY TOOLBOX: PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PATENT LAW
A politics of patent law has to follow from a design of intellectual property
laws and institutions." This Article focuses on those participatory mechanisms
Hugh Baxter, Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law and Democrafy, 50 BuFF. L. REV. 206 (2002).
o Erik Luna has defined "institutional design" as "the process of creating or modifying the rules
and incentives of an official entity to achieve certain substantive ends, with the design process
predicated on an understanding of the normative goals of a particular institution." Erik Luna, Race,
Crime, and Institutional Design, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2003 at 183, 190. Institutional
design in patent law has typically focused on modifying the rules associated with a centralized judicial
decisionmaker in patent law such as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, or potentially,
a centralized district court decisionmaker. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit-
A Case Study in SpedaiZed Courts, 64 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing the formation of the Federal
Circuit); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Spedakzation, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004) (analyzing the ongoing impact of the centralized judicial
mechanisms on patent law); Arit K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Poliy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to
Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003) (analyzing the multi-institutional framework
associated with the Federal Circuit); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An EmpiicalAssessment ofjudiaal Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (2004) (analyzing
the empirical data on the effectiveness of the Federal Circuit).
Recently, the redesign of administrative procedures during the examination process has
received scholarly attention. Such design has focused on implementing: mechanisms such as
expanding the type of available proceedings in a variety of ways. "See, e.g.,Jordan K. Paradise, Lessons
From The European Union: The Needfor a Post-Grant Mecbanism for Third-Party Challenge to U.S. Patents,
7 MINN.J. L. Sci. & TECH. 315, 326 (2005) (examining the recent legislative reform and its use of
2006]
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that permit groups to organize and act to impact the relevant agency or judicial
policy maker. For lack of a better word, I call these mechanisms "participatory"
because they ensure the ability of individuals to participate substantively in the
relevant decisionmaking process. This Part will first briefly examine those
mechanisms used by environmental law to expand third party constituency
participation. This Part will then analyze the absence of such mechanisms in
patent law. The absence of such political mechanisms has affected patent law by
limiting the ability of potential constituencies to challenge potential patents.
A. PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Participatory mechanisms are organized around two types of actions: (1)
mechanisms that increase citizen enforcement of the relevant laws; and (2)
mechanisms that increase transparency so that citizens can acquire a greater range
of information on a given topic. These mechanisms serve two complementary
functions within the administrative state. First, these mechanisms reflect a
normative desire to support and legitimize agency behavior.3 As Sidney Shapiro
states, "[a]gency legitimacy is enhanced when procedures make administrators
politically accountable, ensure that agencies stay within their statutory authority,
promote the rationality of agency decisions, and are perceived as fair by the
public."32  Second, these mechanisms serve a practical. purpose, allowing
a post-grant proceeding); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Rehab# Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Heo, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 948 (2004); Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis
ofInter Partes Reexamination, 19 BERKELEYTECH. LJ. 971,973 (2004) (suggesting a two-tiered post-
grant patent review based on the timing of the requested review); Kristen Jakobsen Osenga,
Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Timefor Corrective Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 251-52 (2003) (suggesting that a patent invalidation board
should be used to reexamine patents); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo, Post-Grant Review of
Patents: Enbanng the .Quali' of the Fuel of Interest, 43 IDEA 83, 110 (2002) (positing that the
availability of a post-grant review would allow academic and industrial experts to more fully
participate in patent decisionmaking); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Gronds in Administrative
Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition--and Bqond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 67 (1998) (proposing an opposition system that is more flexible than current
reexamination proceedings); Mark D.Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viahe Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-7 (1997) (analyzing existing post-
examination procedures and suggesting alternatives to those actions).
31 Jerry L. Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Ctiical Stories of Legal
Development, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 267-98 (1990) (stating that positive political theory fails to
sufficiently address normative values that legitimize administrative law).
32 Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory oftheAPA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 92 (1996).
[Vol. 14:63
10
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss1/2
RULES FOR RADICALS
legislators to embed "fire-alarms" that serve to warn regulatory actors of potential
problems in the regulatory process.33
1. Citizen Enforement Mechanisms. Expanded standing claims and citizen suits
are the two primary citizen enforcement mechanisms. 34 To achieve standing to
bring a claim, a party must establish three constitutional requirements: (1) that
the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (2) that the injury can be traced to the
challenged action; and (3) that the injury is redressable.3" The Supreme Court has
further determined that if the injury claimed is the result of a statutory violation,
the injury must be within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the
underlying substantive statute.36 The zone of interest test is distinguishable from
the "injury-in-fact" analysis because the "test focuses on whether Congress
intended an already-injured party to be allowed to sue." 37
Randall S. Abate and MichaelJ. Myers have identified three types of injury in
fact recognized in environmental law.38 Substantive injury includes those types of
harm that exist outside any statutory violations.3 9 In environmental law, liberal
claims of substantive injury have generally been accepted. Beginning with Sierra
Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court outlined a broad theory of injury in fact, which
allowed a plaintiff or organization acting on behalf of its members, to assert that
injury in fact existed as to those potential injuries that caused aesthetic and
environmental injury to an individual plaintiff or a member of an environmental
group.' But in 1992, the Supreme Court raised more hurdles to standing in Lujan
3 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversigbt Overloke" Poice Patrols
versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM.J. POL. SCi. 166 (1984).
3 See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
3 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Supreme Court has noted
that
[A]lthough standing in its outer dimensions is a prudential concept to be shaped
by the decisions of the courts as a matter of sound judicial policy and subject to
the control of Congress, at its core it becomes a constitutional question; for
standing in its most basic aspect can be one of the controlling elements in the
definition of a case or controversy under Article III.
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (citing to Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982)).
36 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,153 (1970) (articulating, for
the first time, zone of interests test under the Administrative Procedure Act).
17 Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue: A BriqrReview ofCurrentStanding Docthine, 71 B.U. L. REV.
667, 680 (1991).
38 Id.
" Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Myers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental Standing: Procedural
and InformationalInjug-in-Fact after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
345, 346 (1994).
40 See 405 U.S. 727 (1972) ("Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being,
are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular
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v. Defenders of the Wildlife.4 ' Authored by Justice Scalia, the majority opinion in
Lujan attempted to limit the scope of injury in fact to "actual or imminent"
environmental injuries. The Supreme Court, however, in Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., appears to have retreated from the
stricter Lujan requirements to lesser ones involving the use of the affected area
and a specified aesthetic injury."
The other two types of injury in fact arise separately from claims of a
substantive injury and instead arise from a class of injuries created by Congress.
Proceduralinjury "is found when a governmental entity's action or inaction violates
a law under a statutory scheme in which Congress has expressly or impliedly
created an interest in private individuals to affect such administrative decisions
through the law."" Parties have been able to claim that an agency has committed
a procedural injury in fact under the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act).4" A lesser type of procedural
environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.").
41 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
42 Id. at 560.
41 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envd. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000) ("We
have held that environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they use
the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be
lessened' by the challenged activity." (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972)));
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 256-58 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting a
Laidlaw analysis for environmental plaintiffs); see also Am. Canoe Ass'n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326
F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir. 2003); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001); Hill
v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For commentary acknowledging this retreat, see
William W. Buzbee, Standing and The Statutory Universe, 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 263-67
(2001) (analyzing the lessening of the stringent injury in fact requirement in Laidlaw); Emily
Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A New Look at Environmental
Standing, 24 ENVIRONs ENvTL. L. & POL'YJ. 3, 5 (2000) ("Laidlaw signals a retreat from the Court's
recently strict approach to environmental standing law.').
44 Abate & Myers, supra note 39, at 346.
41 Id. at 353-58. Miriam S. Wolok has identified a number of other statutory context in which
Congress has recognized a procedural injury including: Staggers Railroad Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C.
§ 10101 (2000), United Transp. Union v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 891 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (2000), Fernandez v. Brock, 840
F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988); Ethics in Government Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d
817 (9th Cir. 1986); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2041 (2000), Alvarez v.
Longboy, 697 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1983); Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000), Action
Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Phila. v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacatedon other
grounds, 494 U.S. 1001 (1990); Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 821 (2000),
Ga. Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983); Federal Election
Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2000), Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Miriam S. Wolok, Standing for Environmental Groups:
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injury, informational injuty, exists where a governmental entity's or private party's
failure to provide or collect information required by a statute subverts a group's
organizational ability to obtain relevant information.' Of the three types of
available claims of injury in fact, a claim of informational injury is the narrowest
type of claim that can be possibly be made and appears to be the least successful
injury in fact claim.47
The second type of enforcement mechanism is the use of citizen suits.48 Such
suits give organizations the independent ability to enforce individual or collective
statutory responsibilities.4 9 At least nine of the major environmental statutes
contain citizen suit provisions, which provide individuals and organizations with
the broad-based ability to sue any private or public entity violating a relevant
environmental statute, as well as the narrower ability to sue the relevant
administrators that fail to carry out non-discretionary statutory duties.50 Citizen
suits have proven to be an important element of environmental enforcement
Procedural Injugy as Injury-in-Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 184 n.152 (1992).
46 Abate & Myers, supra note 39, at 349-52.
47 id.
48 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
41 Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, 'The Friendship of the Peopk": Cihizen Particpration in
EnvironmentalEnforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 301-02 (2005) ("Indeed, one of the benefits
produced by citizen suits, namely, increased competition for enforcement, has far surpassed the
effects originally envisioned. At the federal level, 'the growth of private enforcement is acting as a
competitive spur to government enforcers, prodding them to improve their management tools for
measuring, securing, and overseeing compliance.' Additionally, competition from private enforcers
may have been the impetus for the EPA's innovative settlements and its reconciliation of policies
and practices.").
50 JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PoLicY 70
(2002); see, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000) (containing a citizen suit
provision); see also Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2000); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2000); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Comprehension and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C § 9659 (2000); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2000); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(2000).
The ability of parties to claim a procedural injury in fact based on the availability of citizen
suits is not clear. Justice Kennedy in a concurrence in Lqjan suggested that the existence of a citizen
suit would not be sufficient to create a procedural injury in fact. Ljajan, 504 U.S. 555, 580.
The citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act does not meet these
minimal requirements, because while the statute purports to confer a right on
'any person ... to enjoin ... the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision
of this chapter,' it does not of its own force establish that there is an injury in
,any person' by virtue of any 'violation.'
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because such statutes allow interested parties to undertake enforcement roles that
may not be possible for underfunded or ideologically hostile environmental
agencies. Moreover, such citizen suits may force agencies to undertake politically
unpopular initiatives.5'
2. Transparency Mechanisms. The final participatory mechanisms are those
statutory requirements that ensure transparency in the public assessment of
environmental risks. Although transparency mechanisms can take many forms,
public transparency has been defined as having two key goals.5 2 First, public
transparency requires that citizens are able to observe, form, and scrutinize policy
choices.5 3 Second, public transparency requires public declaration of any adopted
policy rationales.5 4 Environmental statutes use a number of mechanisms to
increase public transparency in administrative decisionmaking. For instance,
statutory provisions, including § 102(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and § 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), require that policy makers
engage in sustained assessments before undertaking major decisions with
substantive environmental impact.55 Other statutes require policy makers to make
available baseline information about environmental risks.56 For instance, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act requires companies
with ten or more employees to complete a form that reports any release of toxic
chemicals and submit that information to be included in a national Toxic Release
Inventory, which is to be maintained in a publicly accessible form. 7
st Susan George et al., The Pubhc in Action: Using State Citizen Suit Statutes to Protect Biodiversioy, 6
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (1997); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of
Citi:Zen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 187 (2000).
52 Erik Luna, Transparent Pofidn, 85 IowA L. REV. 1107, 1164 (2000).
53 Id.
" Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2000) (requiring that all federal agencies must
consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that their actions will not jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered or threatened species); National Environmental Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. S 4332(C)(i)-(v) (2000) (requiring an assessment of environmental impacts on any major
federal action).
"6E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2000).
17 Id. See also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (2000) (requiring any records, reports, or
information related to toxic, pretreatment, or new source performance standards be made publicly
available); Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13106(e) (2000) (requiring source reduction and
recycling data be made publicly available).
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B. PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS IN PATENT LAW
As discussed above, three mechanisms-standing, citizen suits, and
transparency values-are necessary for a functional politics within a regulatory
regime. Patent law, unfortunately, fails to sufficiently utilize these mechanisms.
1. CiiZen Enforcement Mechanisms. The ability to pursue a suit under the Patent
Act is traditionally understood to be a private right controlled by a limited number
of parties (potentially, the patentee and a competitor) who seek to pursue relief
from a retrospective injury (an infringed-upon patent)."8 This reliance on a private
interest model leads to a reluctance to fully accord standing to parties seeking to
protect broader public interests, such as an error by the patent office that
implicates an entire class of technologies. 9 A reassessment of standing is
necessary if patent law is to be sensitive to these broader concerns of third party
constituencies. Currently, the issue of third party standing in patent law is
determined by the potential timing of a challenge.6" Counterintuitively, I start
with an analysis of standing after the patent has issued since once a patent has
issued, the presumption of ownership in a patent is strong and thus creates
limited opportunities for any party, besides the patent owner, to claim a
substantive injury in fact necessary to maintain an action.6 Arguably, broader
opportunities for an interested third party constituency may be available before
a patent has issued.62 However, the potential for a pre-issuance attack directed
towards the agency's actions in examining the patent has been limited by narrow
interpretations of standing under Patent Act, or alternatively, the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).63
a. Post-Issuance Challenge. Only a patentee has the right to bring a claim of
infringement after a patent has issued.64 Section 281 of the Patent Act states that
only "a patentee" may seek civil remedies for infringement;65 the term "patentee"
is limited to the party to whom a patent has been issued or to successors-in-title
to that patentee.66 So, once a patent has issued, the only party potentially capable
s Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Sef Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1371, 1410-11 (1988) (distinguishing between private and public models of standing).
'9 Winter criticizes the standing jurisprudence within the context of patent law, contending that
the focus on particular, individualized injury prevents parties from raising broader concerns over the
state of a field of technology. Id at 1461.
o See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
61 See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
63 See infra notes 96-143 and accompanying text.
6 Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.").
65 Id.
- 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2000) ("The word 'patentee' includes not only the patentee to whom the
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of suffering a substantive injury to their interest under the Patent Act is the
patentee. The major issue as to standing after post-issuance has been whether a
third party licensee has sufficient standing to bring an independent infringement
action.6' The limited standing afforded to third parties reflects the premium
placed on establishing ownership under the current patent regime. Once a patent
has been examined and issued, the patent owner is granted the right to exclude
others from use.6" But in a sense, the real power lies in the ability to iniiate an
action against other users; this initiative power, for instance, allows a power to
control the timing of the challenges.
This initiative power has been limited somewhat by the ability of a potentially
infringing party to file a declaratory judgment under the federal Declaratory
Judgment Act.69 Under this Act, a party seeking to file a declaratory judgment
must: (1) actually produce or be prepared to produce an allegedly infringing
product; and (2) demonstrate that the patentee's conduct creates an objectively
reasonable apprehension that the patentee will initiate a suit if the activity in
questions continues." Although the ability to raise a preemptive claim under the
Declaratory Judgment Act is broad, the Federal Circuit has been criticized for
mandating that a potential infringer can only bring a declaratory judgment if "an
explicit" threat of litigation exists; a mere accusation of infringement by the
patentee will not suffice to support a successful challenge under the Act."'
patent was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee.'); see also Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw.
Recreational Indus., Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("To bring an action for patent
infringement, a party must be either the patentee, a successor in title to the patentee, or an exclusive
licensee of the patent at issue.'); Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (Fed. Cit.
2000) ("A party may bring an action for patent infringement only if it is the 'patentee,' i.e., if it owns
the patent, either by issuance or by assignment.'). For a review of this standing doctrine, see Roger
D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, The Elusive Logic of Standing Doctrine in Intellectual Property Law, 74 TUL.
L. REv. 1323, 1336-65 (2000) (analyzing the development of the limited standing accorded parties
after a patent has issued).
67 See, e.g., Rite-Hire Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cit. 1995) (examining the
circumstances under which a licensee may have standing to sue as a co-plaintiff in an infringement
action).
6 Schenck v. North Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
69 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
70 Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cit. 1988).
7' Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: Restoring the Balance Between the
Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 903, 935-37 (1997) (citing Phillips Plastics Corp. v.
Kato Hatsujou Kabushiki Kaisha, 57 F.3d 1051, 1052 (Fed. Cit. 1995)). Under the current test for
a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the party must show. (1) an explicit threat of other
action by the patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory
judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit; and (2) present activity by the declaratory
judgment plaintiff which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by the declaratory
judgment plaintiff with the intent to conduct such activity. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc.,
[Vol. 14:63
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently accepted certiorari in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc.,72 to determine if the Federal Circuit's requirement that a licensee
must refuse to pay royalties and commit material breach of the license agreement
to create an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act is too
stringent under existing precedent.73
The Patent Act contemplates-post-issuance-the party best able to bring a
claim is a competitor to the patent owner. Taken together, the norms for
standing and declaratory judgment indicate that the statute contemplates that the
onus for determining a patent's validity can be placed on either the patent owner
or potential competitors. The Patent Act's grant of special status to competitors
can be seen most clearly within the context of a subsidiary inquiry undertaken in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machineyg & Chemical Corp., which states that
a patent's immunity from suit under antitrust laws is withdrawn if a patentee has
fraudulently obtained a patent.74 Such Walker Process claims are brought as
counterclaims by a direct competitor in response to a patentee's claim of patent
infringement.75 This is a traditional posture for patent claims, demonstrating the
special status accorded to direct competitors.76 Recently, however, third party
consumers have attempted to raise a Walker Process claim in order to challenge
fraudulently obtained patents.77 At least one court, in Molecular Diagnostics
Laboratories v. Hoffman-La-Roche, Inc., has argued that since a Walker Process claim
is directed towards antitrust injury (and not patent injury), consumers directly
harmed by the antitrust injury have standing to bring a claim." This line of cases
395 F.3d 1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
72 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006).
13 See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cit. 2004) (holding that to obtain
standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act a licensee must commit material breach of the license
agreement).
74 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).
75 See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1067 (Fed. Cit. 1998)
("[An antitrust claim premised on stripping a patentee of its immunity from the antitrust laws is
typically raised as a counterclaim by a defendant in a patent infringement suit." (citing Argus Chem.
Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381, 1383 (Fed. Cit. 1987))).
76 See NobeobarmaAB, 141 F.3d at 1067.
n Id.
'8 See 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Walker Process claims are intended to address
antitrust injury, thus the requirement that a plaintiff be able to allege a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. A Walker Process claim is not a fraud claim, as the court intonates, but an antitrust
violation. The harm is not the invalid patent, but the use of the invalid patent to establish a
monopoly." (citations and footnote omitted)). Contra In re Remeron, 335 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529
(D.N.J. 2004) ("Plaintiffs, as direct purchasers, neither produced mirtazapine nor would have done
so; moreover, Plaintiffs were not party to the initial patent infringement suits. Plaintiffs may not
now claim standing to bring a Walker Process claim by donning the cloak of a Clayton Act
monopolization claim.'.
20061
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reveals the strength of the competitive presumption in patent law since not even
the court in Molecular Diagnostics Laboratories questions the limited standing
accorded in patent law to third parties other than competitors.
79
Reliance on competitors to prove or disprove patent validity can be
problematic as competitors may have compelling business reasons for not
pursuing a challenge to a particular patent. Indeed, the battle between the makers
of interactive books outlined at the beginning of this Article indicates that
settlement may often be a strategic business choice."0 The battle ended quietly
with a private settlement."1 The important public goals associated with the
Cheerios battle-namely, the potential invalidity of a patent that impacted
substantive uses in the public domain-were secondary to prudently avoiding
costly, long-term litigation. Such incentives have proven to be extremely
problematic within the pharmaceutical context. For example, increasingly, a
generic producer may derive significant benefits by settling with a conventional
producer; indeed, the potentially collusive practices between generic and
conventional producers of pharmaceuticals have been the subject of increasing
judicial and administrative scrutiny.82
b. Pre-Issuance Challenge. Even if a claim of substantive injury is not
available as a claim, theoretically, a range of administrative actions could be
7 ou /r iagnoi , 4,2 F. Supp. at 280 (The iclusion of the fact that the plaintiffs were not
parties in the initial patent infringement suits suggests that the court confused the harm addressed
through a WalkerProcess claim. The court appears to believe that, standing alone, the enforcement
of the fraudulently procured patent is the relevant injury in a Walker Process claim, hence the court's
assertion that a plaintiff must be an actual or potential competitor. This, however, is not the case.").
s See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
s See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
82 Leila Abboud, Branded Drugs Settfing More Generic Suits, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2006, at B1
(detailing the increasing reliance of pharmaceutical companies on setdement with generic
competitors); see also FED. TRADE COMI'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION, AN FTC STUDY (2002), availabk at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS21619
(analyzing collusive methods of preventing full generic competition within the pharmaceutical
competition). For cases representative of this trend, see, e.g., In reTamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
429 F.3d 370, 374 (2d Cit. 2005) (holding that a patent infringement suit entered between a pioneer
manufacturer and a generic competitor to settle a pending appeal did not violate relevant antitrust
laws); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cit. 2005)
(questioning whether the contested agreements unreasonably restrained trade in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act); Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11 th Cit. 2003) (examining whether agreements not to enter
the market between a pioneer manufacturer and generic competitors were restraints against trade
under the relevant antitrust law); In re Cardizem Co. Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 900 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that payment of forty million dollars by a pioneer manufacturer to a generic
competitor so the competitor would refrain from entering the market was a horizontal market
allocation agreement and thus, per se illegal under the relevant antitrust laws).
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subject to attack by an interested third party that claims an administrative actor
in the PTO or other relevant agency had violated a statutory duty and thus
committed a procedural injury in fact under either the Patent Act or the APA.
Such a third party standing challenge may be easier to make in a pre-issuance
context since the presumption of ownership granted by an issued patent has not
attached. However, the Federal Circuit has significantly limited use of these two
available statutory avenues.
A third party could claim that the existence of ex parte reexamination and
optional inter partes reexamination proceedings creates an implied private interest
that would support a claim of procedural injury in fact under the Patent Act. Ex
parte reexamination and optional interpartes reexamination proceedings can be
used to introduce a limited category of prior art citations.8 3 A recent amendment
to the Patent Act, the optional interpartes proceedings, grants broader rights to the
third party requester than a reexamination proceeding in one key respect: a third
party requester in optional interpartes proceeding can appeal to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences and, if dissatisfied with the Board's decision,
appeal to the Federal Circuit.' 4
While each of these procedures could potentially serve as the basis for third
party procedural standing, such claims have been rejected by the Federal Circuit.
For instance, in Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc., v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, the Federal
Circuit upheld the district court's decision that standing could not be granted to
a third party requester who had sued the PTO to revoke a reexamination
certificate and reopen the reexamination proceeding since the Patent Act accorded
no rights to a third party requester after the initial request for reexamination.8 5
The Federal Circuit concluded that two key reexamination limits indicated that
Congress did not accord procedural standing to third parties under the Patent
Act. 6 First, once the third party requester initiated a reexamination, the requester
could not participate throughout the rest of the proceedings. 7 Second, the third
83 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000) ("Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art
consisting of patents or printed publications which that person believes to have a bearing on the
patentability of any claim of a particular patent."); 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2004) ("Any third party
requester at any time may file a request for interpartes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the
basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301.").
14 35 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (2000) ("[A third party requester] may appeal under the provisions of
section 134, and may appeal under the provisions of sections 141 through 144, with respect to any
final decision favorable to the patentability of any original or proposed amended or new claim of the
patent...."). Third-party requesters cannot initiate a de novo civil action in the district court. See
35 U.S.C. § 141 (2005).
8- 882 F.2d 1570, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
s6 Id. at 1573-74.
87 Id. This argument is supported by two other cases. See Boeing Co. v. Comm'r of Patents and
Trademarks, 853 F.2d 878, 880 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that a third party has no standing to appeal
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party requester could not appeal any reexamination determination.8 The court
in Sntex also concluded that even if the injury claimed by a third party was a
genuine procedural injury in fact, standing could still be denied because the injury
of the requester was potentially not redressable.89 The court equated Syntex's
position as a third party requester to that of a potential infringer seeking to
preemptively challenge the issuance of a patent and concluded that in both cases
"a remedy must await confrontation with the patent owner."9 Therefore, a third
party could not bring a direct suit against the PTO because their injury in fact was
not redressable.91
The result in Syntex has been interpreted to suggest that a third party cannot
claim any threatened or alleged procedural injury in fact under the Patent Act since
the limited right of protest outlined in reexamination procedures indicates that the
rights of third parties are not covered under the Patent Act. Two post Syntex
scenarios have arisen. The first scenario mirrors Syntex. a party claims that the
PTO has violated a statutory duty, thus creating a procedural injury in fact.92
Under this scenario, Syntex is used to demonstrate that any standing claim made
by a third party that challenges the procedures of the PTO should be denied
because the Patent Act (as demonstrated by the limited rights accorded to third
party requesters under the reexamination procedures) does not recognize an
implied private right to challenge the outcomes of these procedures. The second
Syntex scenario recognizes that even if procedural injury in fact is available as a
claim, such injury is not redressable because once the PTO has issued a patent,
a party must directly confront the patent owner." The strength of Syntex is
questionable. The statutory landscape on which the holding in Syntex is based has
changed. Optional inter partes proceedings provide patent owners with the ability
to participate throughout the entire process and a right of appeal.94 These new
because of limited right to file a protest); Yuasa Battery Co. v. Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks,
3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1143, 1144 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that a third party reexamination requester does not
have standing to appeal reexamination decision).
8 Syntex, 882 F.2d at 1573-74.
89 Id. at 1576.
90 Id.
91 Id
92 See, e.g., Hitachi Metals Ltd. v. Quigg, 776 F. Supp. 3, 10 (D.D.C. 1991) (determining that a
plaintiff seeking to challenge the issuance of a regulation that retroactively applied to a reissue
application could not be granted standing because third party procedural tights were limited to the
right to file a protest under the Patent Act) (citing Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817, 823 (9th Cir.
1986)).
9' Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Lehman, 959 F. Supp. 539,544 (D.D.C. 1997) ("A potential infringer
may not sue the PTO seeking retraction of a patent issued to another by reason of its improper
allowance by the PTO; a remedy must await confrontation with the patent owner.").
94 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(2) (2000) ("Each time that the patent owner files a response to an action
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rights answer both arguments made against finding that no implied right exists
under the Patent Act. The amendment of the Patent Act to include optional inter
panes procedures provides an opportunity to revisit the ability of third parties to
claim procedural injury in fact under the Patent Act.
The Federal Circuit has placed similar limits on third party claims under the
APA. While the Patent Act subjects agency decisionmaking to a narrow range of
reviewable actions, such as reexamination and correction of mistakes or errors,
the APA would allow third parties to challenge a potentially broader range of
agency behavior.9" Section 702 of the APA affords any "person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute"96 the ability'to obtain judicial
review of a range of agency actions under § 706.97 The Federal Circuit, however,
has also placed significant limits on third party standing under the APA as is
demonstrated by its holding in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg (ALDF).9
ALDFinvolved a challenge by nine plaintiffs99 to the Commissioner of the PTO's
issuance of a controversial notice that stated that non-naturally occurring non-
human multicellular organisms were patentable subject matter under § 101 of the
Patent Act. 1' The plaintiffs filed a joint complaint, which had two primary
on the merits from the Patent and Trademark Office, the third-party requester shall have one
opportunity to file written comments addressing issues raised by the action of the Office or the
patent owner's response thereto, if those written comments are received by the Office within 30 days
after the date of service of the patent owner's response."); see also 35 U.S.C' § 315(b).
"' Under the Administrative Procedure Act, a range of administrative actions are subject to
review, among them, rule-making procedures, orders, adjudications, sanctions, and other types of
relief. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
96 Id. ] 702.
9 Id. § 706. Section 706(2) provides for judicial review of agency action that is: (1) arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance of the law; (2) contrary to a
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority,
or limitations; (4) without observance of procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence in a case subject to administrative hearing; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that
the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. Id. § 706(2)(A-F) (2005).
9' Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 710 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aftd, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) [hereinafter ALDfl.
The nine plaintiffs were the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF), the American Society for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), the Main Humane Society (MHS), Wisconsin
Family Farm Defense Fund (WFFDF), John Kinsman, Michael Cannell, Humane Farming
Association (HFA), Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights (AVAR), and People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). ALDF, 932 F.2d at 923, n.3. For further background on
the controversy over the patenting of animals, see ElizabethJoy Hecht, ByondAnimal Legal Defense
Fund v. Quigg: The Conroversy Over Transgenic Animal Patents Continues, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1023,
1043-45 (1992) (reviewing the factual and legal issues that arose in ALDF).
100 ALDF, 932 F.2d at 923.
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counts. 1 ' In Count I, the plaintiffs alleged that the Commissioner had violated
§ 553 of the APA by issuing the notice without sufficient notice and comment
rulemaking under the statute." 2 In Count II, the plaintiffs further alleged that the
Commissioner acted in excess of his statutory jurisdiction or authority under §
706(2)(C) of the APA by declaring animals as patentable subject matter under §
101 of the Patent Act.
10 3
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the plaintiffs had
failed to sufficiently prove that they had standing on both claims."° On Count
I, the organizational plaintiffs claimed that the Commissioner had violated their
collective rights to participate under § 553 of the APA since the Commissioner
did not allow them to comment on his interpretation of § 101.105 In essence, the
plaintiffs argued that they suffered an informational injury in fact and therefore,
had standing to raise a claim. The Federal Circuit rejected this claim, concluding
that the notice at issue did not have the full force and effect of the law and
therefore, was an interpretative rule that did not fall within the scope of§ 553.1°6
The notice, the Federal Circuit concluded, was interpretative because the
Commissioner did not issue the notice under any relevant statutory authority. °7
The Commissioner was not acting under his statutory authority since the notice
relied on a previous interpretation of the same issue undertaken by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).'0 8 In doing so, the Board was acting
under its independent statutory authority to interpret the Patent Act, and
therefore, the notice was merely a secondary interpretation of the same issue.
0 9
Moreover, even if the BPAI's intervening interpretation had not occurred, the
Federal Circuit concluded that the Commissioner did not interpret the Patent Act
under his statutory authority, which only extends to rules and notices directed
towards the "conduct of the proceedings" before the PTO. 110
101 Id at 926, 931.
102 Id. at 926.
103 Id at 931.
10' Id. at 939.
' Id. at 926. Under § 553 of the APA, outside parties can participate in certain categories of
agency rulemaking, by submitting written data, views, or arguments. General notice of the relevant
agency-decisionmaking must be published in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
0 Section 553(b) does not apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
107 ALDF, 932 F.2d at 930.
105 Id at 929.
109 Idat 928.
110 Id at 930. At the time of ALDF, § 6 of the Patent Act outlined the scope of the
Commissioner's authority. This authority is now contained in § 2 of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 2(b)(2)(a).
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The Federal Circuit also rejected the standing claims made by the parties in its
analysis of Count II, which claimed that the notice violated § 706(2)(C) of the
APA.'" In this section of ALDF, the Federal Circuit is preoccupied with the
problem of "indirect" standing, which occurs where the actions of a third party
may influence the redressability of a potential plaintiffs injury."2 The opinion
addressed the claims of two different categories of plaintiffs." 3 The first category
ofplaintiffs, which included two farming associations and farmers, argued that the
notice's allowance of transgenic animal patenting would cause an economic injury
in fact by forcing them to pay royalty payments for genetically altered animals and
increasing the cost of operations associated with employing non-genetically
modified animals." 4 The second category of plaintiffs, the animal protection
associations, claimed that the rule would increase their enforcement
responsibilities under state statutes to prevent inhumane experiments that would
arise as a result of increased patent protection."
5
The Federal Circuit rejected the claims of the first category of claimants." 6
The court asserted that the type of economic injuries alleged were "speculative"
because it was unclear whether there would be an actual increase in either royalty
payments or cost of operations." 7 Moreover, even if such claims of injury in fact
were sufficient, such claims could be not redressed by a favorable court decision
since the plaintiffs' claims of injury rested on "the speculative activities of third
party competitors."' " By contrast, the Federal Circuit recognized claims of injury
in fact made by the animal protection associations as legitimate under existing
precedent because state statutes imposed an obligation upon the associations to
fulfill a range of duties to protect animals." 9  However, the Federal Circuit
ultimately rejected the animal associations' claims, once again, because of the
difficulty of proving a causal link between the PTO's issuance of a notice and the
potential injury resulting from the fact that "researchers would likely disregard
applicable animal protection laws because of the Notice."'20 The Federal Circuit
appears to require that claims of an injury in fact have a very direct harm to the
interest of the organization or claimant at issue.
"' ALDF, 932 F.2d at 931.
112 Id. at 935.
113 Id. at 932.
114 Im
115 Id. at 937.
116 Id.
17 Id. at 934.
118 Id.
219 Id at 936 ("Nevertheless, we recognize that courts have found the type of allegations made
by ASPCA and MHS here sufficient for showing personal injury.").
220 Id. at 937.
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Finally, the Federal Circuit stated that, even if the third parties' claims were to
be accorded standing, none of the claims made by the plaintiffs at issue-the
farmers, the farming associations, or the animal protection associations-fe
within the zone of interests contemplated by the Patent Act.' Preliminarily, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the zone of interest claim could be
satisfied by treating § 702 as the relevant statute under which a person aggrieved
by agency action could claim standing to challenge that action.' 22 Rather, a
standing claim brought under the APA had to fall within the zone of interest
contemplated by the Patent Act."2 Here, the plaintiffs argued that their claims fell
within the Patent Act because patents were issued for public benefit under the
Constitution.2 4 The Federal Circuit, contending that acceptance of such claims
would "encompass[ ] any member of the public who perceives they will be
harmed," rejected the claims on two grounds. 2  First, such a broad claim would
subject issued patents to collateral attack by competitors on the validity of
patent.26 Second, the Federal Circuit implied that the statutory scheme of the
Patent Act suggests that Congress intended to preclude judicial review for third
parties altogether. 27 In coming to this conclusion, the Federal Circuit relied on
Block v. Community Nutiion Institute121 In Block, the Supreme Court held that while
milk handlers could seek judicial review of pricing orders issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,
consumers did not have a corresponding right since the statute entirely precluded
third party relief under a complex administrative scheme. 29
ALDF has had significant consequences for third party standing under the
APA. Had the Federal Circuit rejected the Complaint on the grounds outlined in
Count 1,13 ° ALDF would have had merely articulated the types of PTO
administrative actions subject to the notice and comment procedures outlined in
the APA. 3' ALDF, however, is representative of three trends within patent law.
First, the Federal Circuit's analysis of third party standing in ALDF reveals the
121 Id.
12 Id (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702).
123 Id.
124 Id at 938.
125 id
126 id.
127 Id.
128 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
129 Id at 348; ALDF, 932 F.2d at 938.
130 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 ("As we have previously held, the
broadest of the PTO's rulemaking powers-35 U.S.C. § 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to
promulgate regulations directed only to 'the conduct of proceedings in the PTO'; it does not grant
the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules.").
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central dilemma of third party standing in administrative patent law. If third
parties can only be injured by an issued patent, then third party injury is always
speculative (in that it depends on the actions of the patentee), and thus can never
be potentially redressable. Such a formulation ignores other types of procedural
and informational injury that have been recognized in environmental law that
could be translated to the arena of patent law. These interests could include the
efforts of an organization to prevent a patent from issuing because of the patent's
ability to impact an area of technology useful to its members, to assess the efforts
of a particular examiner, or to participate in the creation of policies that impact
its members.
Second, ALDF remains anomalous in that the Federal Circuit ruled that
procedural standing under the Patent Act was entirely precluded under 5 702 of
the APA. 3 2 ALDF, however, arguably fails to scrutinize the statutory scheme of
the Patent Act with the same care undertaken by the Supreme Court in Block,
lumping together post-issuance challenges, such as civil actions related to
infringement, interference, and pre-issuance challenges, such as reexamination.'
33
Finally, ALDF conflates a range of different parties-potential competitors and
public interests-into the same category. Therefore, under ALDF a competitor
is potentially precluded from bringing a procedural standing claim under the APA
in the same way as a third party is precluded from bringing a claim. Such a
stringent reading of procedural standing would be in direct conflict even with the
limited rules of standing outlined within the post-issuance context.
c. Other Methods of Citizen Enforcement. No equivalent to a "citizen suit"
exists in patent law that permits third party participation to prevent potential
violations of the relevant statute or enforce proper application of the statute. To
the extent that reexamination proceedings or optional interpartes proceedings seek
to correct errors committed by the examiners, neither of these proceedings can
be seen as a pure citizen enforcement mechanism. As discussed supra, the scope
of such examinations is limited since third party requesters can only cite to written
prior art consisting of patents and prior publications." Thus, a third party
requester cannot submit bases for rejecting the patent application such as a failure
to properly disclose under 35 U.S.C. 5 112, a failure to properly disclose previous
non-written uses under 35 U.S.C. 5 102, or a failure to act properly before the
examiner. 35 Moreover, no matter how inadequate, these mechanisms have a
32 ALDF, 932 F.2d at 938.
133 Seegeneral# id. at 938 (citing to Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)).
134 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(MPEP) § 2206 (8th ed. 2001).
"' Id. ("Thus, for example, a prior art citation cannot include a statement as to the claims
violating 35 U.S.C. § 112, a statement as to the public use of the claimed invention, or a statement
as to the conduct of the patent owner.").
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retrospective effect-a third party could not object to potential examiner error
during the prosecution of a patent. 3 6 The limited opportunities to challenge the
adequacy of the examination process leave third parties with no option to
significantly police the behavior of the examiner.
2. Transparengy Mechanisms. Of the three relevant mechanisms, transparency
mechanisms have been most successfully incorporated into the structure of patent
law. For instance, publicly accessible information about the administrative actions
of the PTO is available in various electronic formats. 37 One key exception,
however, limits the transparency of the patent regime. An anemic publication
requirement allows a patent to remain confidential for the entire scope of the
application unless the patent applicant has filed or will file a foreign application,
in which case the patent application has to be published within a period of
eighteen months' 3  While the publication requirement has been generally
criticized for its ability to support submarine patents (broad patents that lie
dormant for a number of years and then are used to impact a mature industry),
they are also damaging from a political standpoint because limited publication of
135 Indeed, even a patent applicant cannot challenge potential examiner error during the
prosecution of a patent. The Federal Circuit has determined that patent applicants cannot
preemptively challenge the actions of an examiner under the APA. See Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, 393 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting).
137 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/main/
patents.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2006). The PTO website contains significant information resources
that allow users to research existing patents and publications as well as relevant laws, rules, and
examining procedures. Id. The website further contains information about the primary
administrative bodies of the PTO, including the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences and the
Patent and Trademark Office Public Advisory Committees, which are composed of diverse users
of the PTO who assess the practices and procedures of the agency. Id; see 35 U.S.C. § 5(d)(1) (2000).
The public advisory committee publishes an annual report that outlines an effort to make
information publicly accessible, including overall information related to the types of examinations
conducted throughout the year. PTO PAT. PuB. ADvIsoRY COMNITrEEANN. REP. (Nov. 30, 2005),
availabk at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/acrobat/ppac annualrpt_05.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
138 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000) ('Except as provided in subsection (b), applications for patents shall
be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark Office.... ."); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (2005).
Moreover, four types of patent applications never have to be published: (1) a non-pending patent
application; (2) a patent application subject to a secrecy order for national security reasons; (3) a
provisional application; and (4) a design patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv) (2000).
The publication requirement has been subject to a number of suggested reforms. See, e.g., Jay P.
Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 780 (2002) ("I
suggest that patent applications be published ninety days after the issuance of the first Office Action.
This publication date is carefully chosen to address the concerns associated with an inordinately early
publication date, such as prompt publication at the time of filing. In addition, this publication date
will permit a patentee to assess her chances of getting an issued patent or preserving the option of
keeping her invention a trade secret based on the results of the first Office Action.').
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patent applications deprives interested constituencies of early information that
would allow them to monitor a particular industry and to bring pressure to bear
on the relevant decisionmaker.
II. A PARTICIPATORY PATENT BARGAIN?: REDESIGNING PATENT
LAW To SUPPORT PARTICIPATORY MECHANISMS
The absence of participatory mechanisms that support third party
constituencies in patent law appears to result from the pervasiveness of one key
norm in patent law-the metaphor of the patent bargain. The patent bargain has
been a traditional trope of patent law. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., the Supreme Court noted that:
[t]he federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain
for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and non-
obvious advances in technology and design in return for the
exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years. "[The
inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits
indefinitely. In consideration of its disclosure and the consequent
benefit to the community, the patent is granted. An exclusive
enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years, but upon
expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention inures to
the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it
and profit by its use.
139
"3 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,150-51 (1989) (quoting United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (mentioning the patent bargain theory and distinguishing it from copyright theory).
Viva Moffat, identifying the consideration contemplated by the patent law regime, states that "the
public . . . gets full disclosure of the invention by the inventor, the right to invent and patent
improvements to the invention, and the right to copy the invention at the expiration of the twenty-
year term." Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights andBackdoorPatents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual
Prpery Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1483 (2004); see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech,
Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Thus, the public's end of the bargain struck by the
patent system is a full enabling disclosure of the claimed technology."); AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("However, as part of the quidpro quo of the patent bargain, the
applicant's specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the
claimed invention."). For a more detailed discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence on this issue,
see Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatogy State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain MetapbhorAfer Eldred,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1320-21 (2004) (analyzing the development of the patent bargain
metaphor within the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court).
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The patent bargain presupposes a bilateral relationship between the patent owner
and the government that resists third party demands. Patent bargain theory
describes two acts: (1) the existence of an original inventive act that results in a
potential claim of ownership on the part of the inventor;14 and (2) the existence
of a governing authority with the ability to verify ownership of the property
right.' If we assume that the government acts for itself in the singular manner,
the term "bargain" implies an exchange between two equal actors that excludes
all others.
Commentators have objected to the patent bargain on three major grounds.
First, commentators have contended that the metaphor of patent bargain fails to
acknowledge the origins of patent law in trade policy, and therefore, fails to
properly explore the interdependence of trade and patent policy.'42 Such
interpretations challenge the metaphor of the patent bargain by shifting the
interpretative focus from the natural rights of the inventor to the competitive
needs of the governing state. Moving to a trade-based patent regime would
" John Locke's "fruits of labor" theory provides the basis for the patent bargain theory. Locke
posited that property is a natural right, inhering in an inventor, because of the inventor's initial labor
investment in the potential invention. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
§§ 27-28 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1690); see also Adam Mossoff, Locke's
Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 156-58 (2002) (analyzing the theoretical
foundations of Locke's labor theory of property); Andrew R. Sommer, Trouble on the Commons: A
Lockean Justification for Patent Law Harmonization, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 141, 144
(2005) (proposing that international intellectual property law adopt Locke's political theory to justify
harmonization with other national regimes).
141 American intellectual property theorists have always regarded the Lockean claim of ownership
based on natural rights as paramount; however, this theoretical justification may minimize the
benefits of the alternative theory offered byJean-Jacques Rousseau. Most notably, while recognizing
the existence of natural law, Rousseau rejected a property right based on a strong natural right to the
fruits of labor because such a natural right did not adequately protect the rights of a property owner.
An inherent natural property right grounded in an individual's labor fails, according to Rousseau,
because it does not oblige others to respect that right. Rather, Rousseau posits two types of potential
property rights: (1) a minimal possessory right based on natural right; and (2) public possession,
which he posits is the legal title of possession enjoyed by an owner within society. See JEAN-
JACQUES RoussEAu, THE SoCIALCONTRACr 65-68 (Maurice Cranston trans., Penguin Books 1968)
(1762).
142 See, e.g., DOREN S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER (2004); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An
IntellectualHistogy, 1550-1800,52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259-76 (2002); Srividhya Ragavan, Can't We
All GetAlong?: The Caefora Workable Patent Model, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 117, 130-49 (2003) (tracing the
development of trade-based policies in developing nations after World War II, using India as a
primary example); Shanker A. Singham, Competition Poke and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and
the Inteoface Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
363, 375-79 (2000) (examining the positive role of patent laws in generating economic markets in
developing nations).
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highlight the importance of harmonization with Europe and Japan, the major
alternative patent systems.' Second, critics have argued that the patent bargain
fails to adequately explain why patent law serves to protect the creative effort
necessary to invent a particular product and have sought to explore the proper
way to enshrine incentives for creative effort that does not rely on a natural rights
philosophy.'" Finally, the metaphor of the patent bargain, as Shubha Ghosh and
others have acknowledged, fails to precisely account for a multilateral exchange
between multiple parties.4 s Unlike others, however, I am not willing to
completely abandon the patent bargain. The patent bargain serves a politically
persuasive purpose in that it justifies to non-owners why the claims of intellectual
property owners are honored."6 Moreover, the patent bargain serves to legitimize
agency behavior to its regulated parties. We can, however, relegitimize the patent
bargain by invigorating the abilities of third parties to participate in the process
of evaluating patents.
The question, then, is the form such a participatory bargain could take. A
revised patent bargain can take two forms. First, we can structure third party
participation around a structuralpluraist model of group interaction, which stresses
allowing competition among various groups to resolve conflicts around legal
issues."' Notably, the suggested reforms contained in multiple bills proposed in
143 Singham, supra note 142, at 379-80.
14 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Propery, Intellectual Property, and Free Rding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031,
1055 (2005) ("Intellectual property, then, is not a response to allocative distortions resulting from
scarcity, as real property law is. Rather, it is a conscious decision to create scarcity in a type of good
in which it is ordinarily absent in order to artificially boost the economic returns to innovation.");
Clarisa Long, PatentSignale, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 636 (2002) ("Rather than conceptualizing patent
law as a set of legal rules that allows individuals to privatize what would otherwise be dissipated in
the public domain, I will instead consider patents as a means of credibly publicizing information.").
145 Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatogy State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain After Eldred, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1345 (2004) ("Reducing patents to a bilateral exchange, as social
contract theory does, fails to incorporate issues like administration and morality into the contract.').
14 The patent bargain, then, can be seen as a political construct that supports the legitimacy of
patent norms. As originally conceived by Max Weber, the concept of legitimacy seeks to answer why
individuals consent to political authority. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy ofInternational Governance:
A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 601-03 (1999).
Legitimacy can be analyzed in light of three different behavior models: (1) attitudinal approval of
the rules, based upon attachment, loyalty, allegiance, and favorable effective orientation to a political
regime, and enforced through normative mechanisms; (2) behavioral consent, signaled by active
participation, passive acquiescence, or obedience to the political regime; and (3) cognitive orientation,
which presupposes that a collective orientation to the rules will bind individuals to the ultimate
outcome. Robin Stryker, Rules, Resources, and Legitimagy Processes: Some Impications for Sodal Conflict,
Order, and Change, 99(4) AM.J. SOC. 847, 856-58 (1994).
147 See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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Congress draw on aspects of a pluralist model."4 Alternatively, we can adopt a
deliberative democratic model. A deliberative democratic model emphasizes
consensual "radically open, potentially transformative dialogues"' 49 as a source of
legitimacy for an inventor to comfortably assert his rights against other
competitive and public interests. I will address each in turn, stressing how each
of these models would likely impact the participatory mechanisms discussed supra.
A. A PLURALIST PATENT BARGAIN?
1. A Framework of Structural Pluralism. The basic model that describes group
participation in legal regimes is known as structural pluralism. While the term
"pluralism" has at least four different definitions,' 50 I refer to pluralism here as
structural pluralism, which holds that access of political constituencies to neutral
decisionmaking is key. DonaldJ. Farole, summarizing a classic structural pluralist
perspective, states that:
According to the pluralist perspective, politics is the resolution of
group conflict. Groups form around common interests, and in a
complex political system Aith multiple points of access, groups help
to coordinate and provide stability to policy making. As a
consequence of competition amongvafious groups, policies emerge
that are responsive at least roughly to public needs, and no single
interest dominates.'
The agency or other decisionmaker serves to arbitrate the competing self-interests
of the relevant constituencies.5 2 The structural pluralist model posits that the
political process benefits by providing adequate access to constituencies so that
they can participate in the process; once that access is granted, the goals
underlying this model have been satisfied. A classic structural pluralist perspective
' See infra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
4 Amy Bartholomew, Human Rights and Post-Impeiaism: Arguingfor a Deiberative Legitimaion of
Human Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 25, 32 (2003).
's Paul H. Conn, Sodal Pluraism and Demotra y, 17 AM. J. POL. Sci. 237 (May 1973). Conn
identifies four types of pluralism: (1) values pluralism, which studies how societies are characterized
by competing values; (2) cultural pluralism, in which societies are characterized by competing cultural
groups; (3) structural pluralism, which studies how the government structures interest group
participation; and (4) social pluralism, which studies how diversity of groups are organized to
compete formally and informally for societal rewards. Id. at 237-38.
"' DONALDJ. FAROLE,JR., INTEREST GROUPS ANDJUDICIAL FEDERALISM: ORGANIZATIONAL
LITIGATION IN STATE JUDICIARIES 14 (1998).
152 Guana, supra note 25, at 23.
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is illustrated by the Supreme Court's rejection of the potentially substantive
impact of § 102(c) of NEPA in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.'53 In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court limited the
scope of judicial review of agency decisionmaking under § 102(c) to whether the
agency had properly followed the required agency procedures." 4
These three mechanisms discussed above-standing, citizen suits, and
transparency-reflect basic norms of structural pluralism. First, such mechanisms
reflect motivationalnorms, which provide organizational groups with incentives to
sustain actions that either support or contest governmental norms. For example,
citizen suits often provide interested environmental groups the ability to organize
around a perceived local threat and challenge that threat through a lawsuit.' 5
Second, these diverse mechanisms reflect informational norms. These
informational norms seek to provide interest groups with access to published
informational sources so that the groups can assess both the methods and
outcomes associated with agency decisionmaking. These norms reinforce each
other-increased access to information can support the preexisting motivational
aspirations of potentially interested political constituencies.
Legal regimes in the United States reflecting a structural pluralist perspective
have traditionally been organized around two models. The first, the New Deal
regulatory regime, exemplified three values: (1) the primary administrator was
representative of diffuse public interests; (2) the agency was insulated from
political and judicial oversight; and (3) there was an implicit sanctioning of
informal cooperative relationships between business interests and the relevant
agency. 6 The second model is a pluralist regulatory regime, of which the
environmental movement (and its resulting body of law) is the predominant
example. A pluralist regulatory regime centralizes policy making at the national
level in three ways. First, independent agency expertise to determine specific
goals is limited by specific legislative directives.5 7 Second, judicial enforcement
of administrative action becomes more active as review of agency action becomes
153 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
154 Id. at 548.
155 For examples of this strengthened standing, see, e.g., ANDREWJAY KOSHNER, SOLVING THE
PUZZLE OF INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION 46-49 (1998) (analyzing the impact of broadened
standing rules on the types of litigation brought under the Establishment Clause); Kim Lane
Scheppele & Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Iigalion Srategiees of Interest Gmps, in MOBILIZING INTEREST
GROUPS IN AMERICA 157,164-65 (ack L. Walker,Jr., ed. 1991) (analyzing the impact of broadened
standing claims on environmental groups' organization).
156 GEORGEHOBERG, PLURALISM BY DESIGN: ENVIRONMiENTALPOLICY AND THE AMERICAN
REGULATORY STATE 29-31 (1992).
117 Id. at 45-46.
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more searching." 8 Third, a pluralist regulatory regime is characterized by a
network of actors, such as public policy interest organizations, competing
business interests, and academic actors, who are competing at range of policy
levels to assert their policy interests.'59 The participatory mechanisms discussed
supra in many ways result from the emergence of a pluralist regime in
environmental law.
While the structural pluralism model is usually seen as the predominant model
of group interaction, commentators have raised two criticisms about this model.
First, the mechanisms discussed supra, may not have any real impact on the actual
actions of the decisionmaker."6 Critics have contended that substantive
outcomes cannot not be obtained by simply affording access to particular
groups. 6 ' Second, the structural pluralist model fails to account for the
organizational challenges faced by social and political groups, such as low-income
or minority communities that do not have access to sufficient political and
economic resources to participate in agency or judicial decisionmaking. 6  Recent
legal commentaries have devoted significant resources to reevaluating the
structural pluralist model in light of these distributional concerns.'63 These
commentaries have suggested that environmental law adopt "deliberative"
mechanisms, including programs like environmental priorities projects, which
seek to engage the relevant actors (government, business, non-governmental
organizations, and non-aligned citizens) to assess and compare environmental
18 Id. at 46-47.
159 Claudia Jau[ps, The United States: Rule by Virtue of Competition, in DEMOCRACY AT WORK: A
COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,
FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 129,131-36 (Richard Munch et al., eds. 2001). See,
e.g., Harvey Bartlett, Comment, Is NEPA Substantive Review Extinct, orMerr# Hibernating? Resurrecting
NEPA Section 102(), 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 411, 428-46 (2000) (summarizing jurisprudence of
Supreme Court on review of agency decisionmaking under NEPA); see also Nicholas C. Yost,
NEPA's Promise--Partially Fullkd, 20 ENvTL. L. 539-49 (1990).
160 For instance, in Stycker's Bay Neighborhood Coundl, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 231 (1980)
(Marshall,J., dissenting), Justice Marshall argued that judicial review of agency action under NEPA
may be necessary if a court could not assess an agency's ultimate conclusion as to the necessity of
a given environmental action.
161 In Strycker'sBqy, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall,J, dissenting),Justice Marshall argued that judicial
review of agency action would be "essentially mindless" if a court could not assess an agency's
ultimate conclusion as to the necessity of a given environmental action. For more discussion of
these issues, see Harvey Bartlett, Comment, Is NEPA Substantive Review Extinct, orMe/ Hibernating?
Resurrecting NEPA Section 102(),13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 411,428-46 (2000); see also Nicholas C. Yost,
NEPA's Promise--Partial4 Fuolled, 20 ENvTL. L. 533, 539-49 (1990).
162 Guana, supra note 25, at 28.
163 Id. at 37-47; see also Kimberly K. Smith, Mere Taste: Democray and the Poktics of Beauy, 7 Wis.
ENVTL. L.J. 151,189-91 (2000).
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risks in a given region. 164 These mechanisms may serve to fully increase the
participation of potentially disenfranchised populations.
2. Structural Pluralism in Patent Law. The recently proposed Patent Reform
Acts reflect elements of a pluralist regime. 16 The Patent Reform Acts outline
procedures for post-grant multiparty opposition procedures so that a person
could challenge a patent claim on all validity issues, including §§ 101, 102, 103,
112, and 251 of the Patent Act. 66 The suggested opposition proceeding has
elements of the structural pluralist model. The procedure at issue presupposes
that the agency would serve as an arbitrator between competing parties that seek
to invalidate a newly issued patent.'67 In one key respect, however, the opposition
proceeding departs from a standard pluralist model since the actions of an
opposer have a substantive outcome in that a successful challenge can prevent the
issuance of a patent.
1 6 1
An opposition proceeding could expand the use of two types of participatory
mechanisms. Initially, the limits placed on third party standing in Syntex and
ALDF may be minimized in light of a newly created opposition proceeding.
Including an opposition proceeding eliminates the two primary objections to third
party standing under the Patent Act. A third party claim of procedural injury in
fact may be available if the right to file an appeal is included in the opposition
procedures.'69 Unlike the reexamination proceeding at issue in Syntex, a specified
'"John S. Applegate, Comparative RiskAssessmentandEnironmentalPriorities Projects: A Forum, Not
A Formula, 25 N. KY. L. REv. 71 (1997).
161 Two major patent reform bills have been proposed. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R.
2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006). The proposed
Patent Reform Act is the result of a series of major reports, supra note 24, and an extensive series of
hearings and town meetings on patent reform. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, A SUMMARY REPORT OF
DISCUSSIONS AT TOWN MEETINGS ON PATENT REFORM (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opp/intellect/050601summarytownmtg.pdf. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission, the
National Academies' Board on Science, Technology, and Economics Policy, and AIPLA held a series
of meetings in February and March 2005 on a proposed patent reform act. Id at 1. These meetings,
however, have been criticized for a lack of interest in the concerns of the public interest patent
community. See, e.g., Colette Vogele, FTC s Patent Reform 'Town Meeing" http://cyberlaw.stanford.
edu/blogs/vogele/archives/002943.shtrml (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). The Patent Reform Act of
2006 is not as far-reaching as the Patent Reform Act of 2005. Notably, the Patent Reform Act of
2006 does not eliminate the best mode requirement. Compare H.R. 2795 § 1 18(d)(1)(b), with S. 318
§118.
'" Both bills retain significant post grant procedures. See H.R. 2795 § 321-338; S. 3818
§ 311-323.
167 H.R. 2795 321; S. 3818 § 315.
16' H.R. 2795 § 355; S. 3818 § 320.
169 Id. § 334 (outlining the process of appeal under the opposition proceeding). Notably,
however, the director still retains discretion to initiate an opposition proceeding. See H.R. 2795
§ 325(a)(1). As a result, the director may be able to argue that the ability to initiate a proceeding may
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right of appeal would demonstrate that the statutory scheme of the Patent Act
does recognize an implied private right on the part of third parties to bring a claim
of procedural injury in fact. 70 Moreover, as the opposition proceeding
contemplates a way in which a third party could directly confront a patent owner,
the third party could contend the claimed injury would be redressable.
Likewise, adopting such procedures could potentially expand the type of
standing afforded to allthird parties under the APA. First, as under the Patent
Act, the existence of an opposition proceeding would alleviate concerns over the
redressability of the injury because of the direct remedy against the owner.
Second, the existence of opposition proceedings would bring third parties within
the zone of interests contemplated by the Patent Act. Therefore, a third party
could raise a claim under § 702 of the APA because the existence of an opposition
proceeding demonstrates legislative intent to bring third parties within the zone
of interest contemplated by the Patent Act. 17' Demonstrating a legislative intent
be an agency action that is committed to agency discretion by law. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a)(2) (2000).
However, one of the notable differences between H.R. 2795 and S. 3818 is that § 318 of the S. 3818
clearly contemplates a process that is not limited by the Director's initiation. For instance, § 312
states that a petition for a post-grant review proceeding may be instituted if a petitioner files a
cancellation petition within twelve months after the patent is issued and establishes a significant
reason to believe that the continued existence of the challenged claim causes or is likely to cause the
petitioner significant economic harm. S. 3818 § 312. Adopting such a provision, however, may limit
claims of other non-economic types of injury.
170 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
171 Recognizing a concentrated legislative intent to increase third party participation may allow
third parties to utilize the test outlined in Clarke v. Securities Industries Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1986). In
Clarke, the Supreme Court, examining whether a securities trading association could sue the
Comptroller for his determination that national banks could offer discount brokerage services, stated
that procedural standing is only to be denied where "the plaintiff's interests are so marginally related
to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that
Congress intended to permit the suit." Id. at 399. The Supreme Court further refined the test in
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479 (1998), by
requiring that in a "zone of interest" inquiry a court must first examine: (1) whether the interests
at issue are "arguably... to be protected" by the relevant statutory provision; and then (2) whether
the interests at issue are affected by the relevant agency action. Id at 492. The scope of the Clarke
test is in dispute. At least two circuits have argued that Clarke and NCUA should be read only to
lessen the standing requirements for competitors under a relevant statute. See, e.g., Dismas Charities,
Inc. v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 401 F.3d 666, 677 (6th Cir. 2005) (procedural standing under the APA
was not granted to a prison services organization, in part because the organization was not a direct
competitor under the relevant statute); TAP Pharms. v. U.S. Dep't of Health Serv., 163 F.3d 199,
207 (4th Cir. 1998) ("The Court's discussion of its prior zone of interests cases in NCUA thus
suggests that a party who is not expressly subject to a statute's provisions can only pass the zone of
interests test if it asserts the interests of a competitor of the subject class."). By contrast, the Third
Circuit has applied liberal review to claims of procedural standing under the APA. See Davis v.
Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 121 F.3d 92, 100 (3d Cir. 1997) (procedural standing was granted to
successor tenants of formerly federally owned property under the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning
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to increase the abilities of third parties may defeat the claim of ALDF that the
statutory scheme of the Patent Act precludes third parties from seeking review
under the APA. The existence of opposition proceedings, then, may have a
significant impact on the types of claims that may be made by third parties.
Besides potentially expanding the scope of standing claims that can be made
by a third party, amending the Patent Act to include opposition proceedings may
create a "citizen suit" type proceeding by permitting potential third parties to
significantly challenge aspects of the initial assessment of the patent. The
contemplated opposition proceeding, nevertheless, is unlike a citizen suit in two
key respects. First, like reexamination proceedings and optional inter partes
proceedings, an opposition proceeding still only has retrospective effect since
third parties cannot challenge examiner error during the prosecution of the
patent. 7 ' Second, the opposition proceeding can only correct examiner error, so
third parties cannot challenge other types of agency actions.'73 For example, a
third party, seeking to monitor the quality of a relevant patent, may want to
correct a typographical error in the patent. The Patent Act, however, only allows
the patent owner or the PTO the ability to correct various mistakes. 74 Amending
a potential patent allowing third parties to correct these types of errors would be
more akin to the citizen enforcement mechanisms used in environmental law.
The failure of current patent reform to include these expanded third party
mechanisms leaves the project of increasing third party participation an
incomplete one.
B. A DELIBERATIVE PATENT BARGAIN?
1. A Framework of Deliberative Proceduralism. A more radical alternative for
reinvigorating the patent bargain than the structural pluralist model is the theory
of discursive or deliberative democracy. Here, I turn to a framework of
deliberative or discursive proceduralism, a theory originated byJurgen Habermas
and refined by other prominent scholars. At its simplest, deliberative
Prevention Act, although the successor tenants were not the intended beneficiaries of the Act
because their claims for damages were closely related to the purposes of the Act, and granting
standing would not interfere with the regulatory scheme under the Act); Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51
F.3d 390, 395-96 (3d Cit. 1995) (procedural standing under the APA was granted to a competing
manufacturer who was not the direct subject of regulatory action because the manufacturer's
competitive interests were consistent with the relevant statute).
172 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
173 Id.
174 See 35 U.S.C. § 254 (2000) (allowing the Director to correct mistakes to an issued patent); id
255 (allowing patent owner to petition to clerical or typographical mistakes); id § 256 (allowing
Director or petitioning owner or relevant assignees to correct the named inventor).
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proceduralism insists that democratic institutions obtain legitimacy by undertaking
deliberative procedures that allow the widest range of arguments to :come into
play under the fairest bargaining conditions.175 A deliberative principle may serve
to reinvigorate the patent bargain, since deliberative procedures would potentially
allow the most participants to negotiate using the most accessible procedures.
Habermas' proceduralism revolves around a number of interlocking premises
that build cumulatively to the above conclusion. I will briefly summarize these
basic premises. Initially, Habermas relies on a complex theory known as
"communicative rationality," which seeks to coordinate communicative
interactions in social settings. 7 6 Communicative rationality is based upon the
belief that individuals are working towards a mutual understanding of claims that
can be accepted or opposed by the relevant audience.'77 If communicative
rationality exists, such claims can be justified and tested within a dialogue on the
validity of that claim. 7 8 This creates what is known as an ideal speech situation.'79
Habermas contrasts communicative rationality to what he terms strategic action.
Strategic action exists where an actor pursues his own selfish, egocentric
calculations of interests; an individual's participation in economic activities is the
archetypical strategic action.' For Habermas, communicative rationality can be
compromised by the breakdown of a shared "background knowledge" that actors
175 JODRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 278, 279-79 (William Rehg trans., 1996). For a review of the
major articles on deliberative proceduralism, see DEMOCRACY (David Estlund ed., 2002). Although
these terms--discursive or deliberative-can be used, I will for ease of reference refer to these
processes as deliberative.
176 Id. at 17-18. Habermas' theory of communicative rationality identifies three types of rational
reasoning: instrumental, communicative, and strategic. Baxter, supra note 29, at 209. While
instrumental action is merely the "solitary performance of a task according to 'technical rules,' "
strategic and communicative reasoning revolve around how individuals reason within social contexts.
Id. Habermas posits that communicative and strategic action is oppositional. JURGEN HABERMAS,
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 134 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber
Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990). According to Habermas,
[clommunicative action can be understood as a circular process in which the
actor is two things in one: an initiatorwho masters situations through actions for
which he is accountable and a product of the traditions surrounding him, of
groups whose cohesion is based on solidarity to which he belongs, and of
processes of socialization in which he is reared.
Id. at 135.
17 IABERMAS, supra note 175, at 18.
178 Baxter, supra note 29, at 214.
179 HABERMAS, supra note 176, at 89.
" "In strategic action, by contrast, actors are oriented toward 'success,' as measured by their
'egocentric calculations' of interest." Baxter, supra note 29, at 210.
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in a diverse society bring to bear in determining the outcome of a relevant issue.'8 '
As societies become characterized by diverse ethical, religious, ethnic, and social
experiences, the risk of disagreement becomes stronger, and thus the
opportunities for genuine communicative action become rarer. 2 This growing
diversity creates incentives for individuals to act strategically in a self-interested
way, thus further undermining communicative rationaty. 3 This purely strategic
action within a pluralist society fails to adequately stabilize a frayed social order,
since it is often removed from any particular ethical content.'
Habermas argues, however, that legal norms serve a socially integrating
function, thus overcoming the fragmentation of society.' Law serves, in
Habermas' words, as a kind of "transmission belt" that transforms everyday social
interaction into an abstracted binding form. 6 The legal order, however, is
compromised by a dual nature. It operates coercively to bind the actions of those
actors, who do not believe in its normative values and are merely acting
strategically, and performatively, because actors comply because they view the law
as outlining valid normative principles that should properly regulate their
existence. 7 Given these tensions, the legal order faces a crisis of legitimacy.' 8
Such a crisis is best resolved by adopting a process that creates opportunity for
substantive deliberation. 8 9
Deliberative democracy, argues Habermas, reconciles the tensions in the legal
order by using elements of the two major political philosophies-liberalism and
republicanism.' 9° Deliberative democracy reconciles the importance placed on
181 Habermas refers to this basic "background knowledge" as the "lifeworld." Id. at 21.
According to Habermas, the lifeworld "forms the context for the process of reaching understanding
but also furnishes resources for it." HABERMAS, supra note 176, at 135.
182 HABERMAS, supra note 175, at 25.
183 Id
184 i.
"s Id. at 39, 83, 448.
186 id
87 Id. at 448; see also Baxter, supra note 29, at 238. Habermas' outline of these structural tensions
reveals a larger theoretical aspect of his project-his attempt to undertake a philosophical inquiry
that mediates the difference between norms, those regulative principles that bind individuals
together, and facts, the empirical accounts of social realities. See Abdollah Payrow Shabani, Habermas'
Between Facts and Norms: Legitming Power?, availabe at http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Poli/
PoliShab.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2006) ("The internal aspect of this tension can be seen between
law as demarcating the range of one's actions and choices, which are social facts, and law as
connected with a universalizable principle of rights, which is the source of law's legitimacy.").
188 HABERMAS, supra note 175, at 488.
189 Id.
190 HABERMAS, supra note 175, at 454. Habermas views his discourse theory as reconstructive
since it reconciles two competing political philosophies: the liberal tradition and the civic republican
theory. Id Habermas views these systems as addressing three different ways in which an individual
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basic liberal rights with a legitimacy derived from the democratic action of active
citizens.' 9' Habermas' deliberative model is characterized by four elements: (1)
citizenship that is defined by a "testing" by which citizens determine the basic
rights which they mutually accord each other; (2) a legal order that bases its
legitimizing norms on reciprocity, a mutual observance of rights and duties; (3)
procedural conditions that ensure a wide array of arguments in deliberation and
in secure fair bargaining conditions; and (4) a democratic process that depends
upon "the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of
communications, as well as on- the interplay of institutionalized -deliberative
processes with informally developed public opinions.' 92
Habermas, in Between Facts andNorms, does not fully outline what he considers
procedures that would constitute a deliberative process. He cites, with
reservations, six procedures suggested by Joshua L. Cohen:
"Process of deliberation takes place in argumentative form,
through the regulated exchange of information and. reasons
among parties who introduce and critically test proposals[;]
U Deliberations are inclusive and public so that all of those who are
possibly affected by the decisions have equal chances to enter and
take part[;]
" Deliberations are free of any external coercion[;]
" Deliberations are free of any internal coercion that could detract
from the equality of the participants[;]
can achieve optimal political autonomy. Habermas argues the individual autonomy of a citizen is
the primary goal within a liberal state. JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 398 n.109 (1992). Therefore, the status of citizen is defined by negative rights
(i.e., the classical rights to life, liberty, and property) that the individual is free to exercise without
interference from the political sphere. Id. at 398. This focus on private autonomy is reinforced by
a legal order that seeks to define the rights of each individual in every case; procedural conditions,
which envision a contest between competing interests seeking the optimal conditions in a separate
political sphere, and a democratic process that is seen as an effective way to manage competing
interests administratively through a simple voting process. HABERMAS, supra note 175, at 269,
270-74, 296. By contrast, republican theory recognizes that, in a publicly autonomous society,
citizens act deliberately to "develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an association
of free and equal citizens." Id. at 269. Republican theory is expansive in the sense that citizen rights
guarantee not only freedom from governmental interference but the positive right to participate in
the constitutive process. Id. at 270. Democratic processes in republican theory are conceived
primarily as participatory discourses. Id. at 270-71. These participatory discourses are based on
ethicopolitical self-understanding wherein citizens share a common background that aids them in
their constitutive decisionmaking. Id. at 269-70.
191 Id at 450.
192 Id at 271, 273-74, 279, 298.
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0 Deliberations aim in general at rationally motivated agreement and
can in principle be indefinitely continued or resumed at any time[;]
and
! Political deliberations extend to any matter that can be regulated
in the equal interest of all.' 93
These procedures, collectively, fall into two categories: fairness and
competence.'94 Fair procedures seek to define "what people are permitted to do
in a deliberative policy-making process."' 9 5 Two characteristics of these listed
procedures would ensure fairness. First, the procedures are horizontal in that all
participants are treated equally within the process, with equal chances to enter,
submit information, and criticize the participation of others. Second, the
procedures are non-coercive in that deliberations are free of any external or
internal coercive behavior. For example, a non-coercive action would be to
decide the final procedure for determining outcomes before the beginning of the
deliberative process so that individuals do not feel as if they are coerced into an
action where the outcome is uncertain.'96 Competence, on the other hand, seeks
to ensure that "the best possible understandings and agreements given what is
reasonably knowable to the participants at the time the discourse takes place."' 97
Those listed procedures are directed towards increasing transparency so as to
ensure competent deliberative procedures. For instance, transparency-the ability
of individuals to effectively access the relevant information so that the
deliberations are inclusive, public, and open-ended-allows all parties to
participate equally.
193 Some of these procedures have been restated for clarity. HABERMAS, supra note 175, at
305-06. Habermas disputes Cohen's conception of a society as one that is "deliberatively steered"
and states that his procedures underestimate an active public sphere. Id at 305, 307. Habermas also
cites with approval Robert Dahl's indicators of democratic procedures:
(a) the inclusion of all affected; (b) equally distributed and effective opportunities
to participate in the political process; (c) an equal right to vote on decisions; (d)
an equal right to choose topics, and more generally, to control the agenda; and
(e) a situation that allows all the participants to develop, in the light of sufficient
information and good reasons, an articulate understanding of the contested
interests and matter in need of regulation.
Id. at 315 (citing ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 59 (1985)).
194 Thomas Webler & Seth Tuler, Fairness and Competence in Civic Partidpation: Theoretical Reflections
From a Case Study, 32 ADMIN. & SoC'Y 566,.568 (2000).
195 Id. at 569.
196 Id.
19' Id. at 571.
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Various procedures have been utilized in different contexts.'. Given these
diverse procedures, I will focus on one category: those involving public scientific
decisionmaking. I do so because the patentability decisions made by the PTO are
part of a larger project of assessing scientific and technical information for
societal use. Scientific decisionmaking processes exist on many different levels,
among them: academic peer review, which seeks to link new ideas within an
ongoing discourse mediated by journals and peer conferences; international,
national and regional policy organizations, which coordinate the interests of
198 Legal scholars have begun to substantively address questions associated with deliberative
democracy, although analysis of already existing projects is limited. See, e.g., ETHAN J. LEIB,
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF
GOvERNMENT (2004) (proposing a fourth branch of government to make laws using randomly
selected civic juries, wholly displacing the referendum and initiative systems as they exist today);
Pablo de Greiff, Deliberative Democragy and Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV 373 (2002) (discussing
the relationship between criminal punishment and deliberative democracy procedures). Michael
Froomkin's analysis of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a standard-setting organization
that resolves all immediate protocol and architecture issues affecting the functionality of the Internet,
is a useful example of a flexible deliberative process. See A. Michael Froomkin, Haberna@Discourse.Net.
Toward a Ci'tal Theory of Cberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 751, 786-87 (2003); see also The Internet
Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org (last visited Oct. 27,2006). The Internet Engineering
Task Force is organized around working groups, which propose, analyze, and test draft protocol
standards. Froomkin, supra, at 786-87. Froomkin's analysis of the IETF demonstrates that the
IETF workinggroups enacted several mecharisms that create a deliberative process. First, to ensure
fairness the IETF working groups: (1) opened meetings "to anyone with the ability to attend
meetings"; (2) allowed individuals to participate in email discussion; (3) disclosed the protocol
standards to all interested participants; and (4) allowed more than one group to test the suggested
protocols. Id. at 799-804. Second, the ITEF process incorporated argumentative elements. Id at
802. Participants have sufficient expertise in their fields and can offer informed arguments on issues
related to the proposed protocol. Id Moreover, the argumentative process itself was structured
consensually, in that the participants, rather than voting on a given proposal, reached a "rough
consensus." Id. at 801.
The political science literature has also analyzed deliberative projects undertaken at the
municipal and state levels. For example, Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright have examined a
number of projects including: (1) the participatory fiscal management projects in the cities of Porto
Alegre, Brazil, and West Bengal, India, which enable residents of the relevant cities and villages to
participate in fiscal management; (2) neighborhood governance councils in Chicago that address
"policing and public schools"; (3) transition councils, such as the Wisconsin Regional Training
Program, which brings together "organized labor, large firm management, and government" to ease
employment transition; and (4) environmental planning such as habitat conservation planning under
the Endangered Species Act that "convenes stakeholders and empowers them to develop ecosystem
governance arrangements." Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Experiments in EmpoweredDeberative
Democray: Introduction, June 1999, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/-wright/deliberative.html; see also
Colleen M. Grogan & Michael K. Gusmano, Deliberative Democray in Theory and Practice: Connecticut's
Medicaid Managed Care Council, 5 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 126 (2005) (examining Medicaid reform in
Connecticut, where the state legislature created an interactive Medicaid Managed Care Council to
ensure that reform was effectively implemented).
40
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss1/2
RULES FOR RADICALS
institutional and corporate interests; and temporary advisory panels, which assess
new sciences and technologies.'99 Scientific decisionmakingis often more difficult
than other types of deliberative processes because a tension exists between
reconciling the'need for technical expertise within a given subject area with the
need for a broad-based societal use for that information.
20 0°
Four different types of deliberative processes are common in the scientific
context: citizen juries, consensus conferences, participatory design, and citizen
science shops. 20 ' Citizen juries seek to involve the public by allowing a panel of
diverse constituencies to consider a number of expert-generated scenarios on a
relevant topic.2"2 These panels are allowed to question the experts as well as
suggest changes to the expert-generated scenarios. 0 3 In consensus conferences,
policy makers and citizens meet over a series of days or weekends on a given
topic. 2°4 The initial meetings are typically devoted to teaching the lay participants
key issues related to the topic as well as selecting the relevant experts who will
testify at a final series of meetings to determine the recommended citizen
outcome. 20 5 The citizens then prepare a report of the proceedings for the relevant
administrative decisionmaker. 2°6 Participatory design allows citizens to participate
in the development of socially relevant design.2° 7 Citizen science shops are
research groups that offer free access to public interest organizations, thus serving
as intermediaries between universities and social groups with specific questions
1" See, e.g., T. Dixon Long, The Govewrnment of Sdence: A Comparative Approach, 1 SCI. STUD. 263
(1971) (outlining and analyzing the functions of different science policy making bodies).
200 ALAN IRWIN, CITIZEN SCIENCE: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, EXPERTISE, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 26-31 (2002).
201 Patrick N. Hamlett, Technology TheoyandDeliberative Democraq, 28 ScI.,TEcH.& HUM. VALUES
112, 118-21 (2003).
202 Id. at 119.
203 Id
2' Id; see general# David H. Guston, Evaluating The First U.S. Consensus Conference: The Impact of
CitZens on Tekcmmunications and The Future, 24 Sci., TECH.& HUM. VALUES 451 (1999) (outlining the
procedures related to consensus conferences within the European context); PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
IN SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS CONFERENCES IN EUROPE (Simon Jose & John Durant
eds., 1995).
205 Hamlett, supra note 201, at 119.
M id
207 Id; seegeneral Randall Trigg, Susan Irwin Anderson & Elizabeth Dykstra-Erickson, eds., PDC
94: Proceedaings of the Paricipatory Design Conference (1995).
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about a relevant topic.2"' Moreover, advisory panels themselves have begun to
incorporate deliberative processes.
209
Commentators have found a number of common elements that reinforce the
success of the deliberative scientific decisionmaking process." °  First,
understanding the impact of the timing of the interactive process is key to
structuring design of a particular project. Early access for the participants to a
chosen interactive process may lead to a more successful outcome.211  For
example, Robert Futrell, examining the disposal of chemical weapons by the
United States Army, concluded that the initial difficulties associated with the
review process could be traced to the failure to include the affected communities
(located in Utah and Kentucky) earlier in the process." 2 The importance of early
inclusive procedures, however, may be limited if non-deliberative administrative
procedures predominate later in the review process. Jurian Edelenbos, examining
a municipal design project in the Netherlands, concluded that even if temporary
interactive procedures are adopted at the beginning of the process, the impact of
these deliberative processes are lessened by the time the administrative sponsor
considers the final product. 13 Edelenbos' work demonstrates the importance of
embedding deliberative processes throughout the entire administrative process.
Second, the type of public engagement contemplated has important
consequences. Two theorists, Gene Rowe and Lynn Frewer, identify three types
of public engagement: (1) communicative engagement, in which information is
"conveyed from the sponsors of the initiative" to the public and thus
0 Joseph Wachelder, Democratirng Sdence: Various Routes and Visions ofDutch Science Shops, 28 SCI.,
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 244, 252-54 (2003) (outlining history of science shops). Examining the
history of science shops, Wachelder concludes that while science shops have served a significant role
in providing information to Dutch public interest groups, the role of these organizations is currently
limited as a result of financial difficulties and withdrawal of support from sponsoring institutions.
Id at 255-57.
Gene Rowe et al., Evaluation of a Deiberative Conference, 29 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 88
(2004) (analyzing the efficacy of deliberative procedures undertaken by advisory panels associated
with the United Kingdom Food Standards Agency to assess the presence of excessive radiation in
food).
20 A number of case studies have examined how organizations have applied deliberative
procedures within the context of scientific discourse. See, e.g., id at 142-43 (analyzing the
deliberative procedures used by New Zealand's Royal Commission on Genetic Modification); Robert
Futrell, Technical Adversarialism and Participatory Collaboration in the U.S. Chemical Wreapons Disposal
Program, 28 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 451 (2003) (analyzing the deliberative process undertaken
with regard to the U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Program); Rowe et al., supra note 209.
211 Futrell, supra note 210, at 462; see also Rowe et al., supra note 209, at 93 ('The participants
should be involved as early as possible in the process, as soon as value judgments become salient.").
212 Futrell, supra note 210, at 472-73.
213 Jurian Edelenbos, Institutional Imp 'cations of Interative Governance: Insightsfrom Dutch Pradice, 18
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'LJ. POL'Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 111, 123 (2005).
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contemplates passive public reception of information; (2) consultative
engagement, in which information is "conveyed from members of the public to
the sponsors of the initiative following a process initiated by the sponsor"; and (3)
participatory engagement, where information is "exchanged between the members
of the public and the sponsors." '214 Each of these types of engagement contains
potentially deliberative elements. For instance, given the pervasiveness of
electronic media, transparency of publicly available information can add a
deliberative potential to communicative engagement. However, a number of
commentators have noted that interactive governance facilitated by electronic
medium is limited by preexisting government norms that may limit the impact of
transparency initiatives."' Consultative engagement has the potential of allowing
the governmental sponsor to learn more information about a given option.
Neither one of these options, however, has the potential of changing the other
parties' initial perspective through argumentative means; such a dialogue is only
made possible through participatory engagement.
Linked to the issue of how participation is structured is who should participate
in the deliberative process. While fairness may be an important value, mediating
the relationships in an efficient manner could result in different levels of standing
to participate in certain processes as opposed to others.216 Formal and informal
24 See Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, A Tpology of Pub& Engagement Merhanisms, 30 SCI., TECH.
& HUM. VALUES 251, 254-55 (2005). Further, Rowe and Frewer define "sponsor" as "the party
commissioning the engagement initiative, which will usually-but not always-be a governmental
or regulatory agency, although representatives of the public may sometimes be the sponsors." Id. at
254.
21 Wilson Wong and Eric Welch investigated the use of e-government measures by fourteen
nations and concluded that "ft]he effect of e-government on accountability of public organization
is affected both by the civil service system within which it is embedded and by its agency-specific
organizational characteristics." Wilson Wong & Eric Welch, Does E-GovernmentPrmoteAccountabity?
A Comparative Anaysis of Website Openness and Government Accountabity, 17 GOVERNANCE 275, 289
(2004). J. Woody Stanley and Christopher Weare, analyzing the interactive process associated with
the 2010 Strategy and Planning Process conducted by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, reached a similar conclusion. J. Woody Stanley & Christopher Weare, The Effects of
Internet Use on Political Partdpation, 36(5) ADMIN. & Soc'Y 503, 522 (2004) ("Comments from the
written docket and Web-based discussion were considered at the draft stage and the subsequent
revision, yet manager comments indicate that neither had a significant impact on the final
plan .... ").
216 Crafting clear participation guidelines is a difficult aspect of a deliberative design. For an
interesting discussion within the context of sustainable development, see Peter Moser, Glorification,
Disillusionment or the Way into the Future? The Signifcance of LocalAgenda 21 Processesfor the Needs of Local
Sustainabihqy, 6(4) LoC. ENV'T 453,464 (2001) ("Participation dilemma (participation overkill): the
comprehensive requirement for participation in Agenda 21 ties up powerful resources that are solely
dedicated to information and co-operation. This weakens content (consent/comprise is put before
sustainability) and becomes tiresome for the working groups (this itself becomes an empty phase).
On the other hand, insufficient participation means that inadequate attention is paid to certain
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requirements can complicate attempts at deliberative dialogues. For example,
during its analysis of the use of genetically modified foods, the Review Committee
on Genetic Modification (RCGM), required to follow formalized administrative
practices, only recognized individuals designated as "interested parties" to testify
at the formal hearings. Interested parties were defined as those persons "with 'an
interest in the inquiry apart from an interest in common with the public' "; all of
the 117 persons who testified at the formal hearings were organizations or
representatives of organizations.217 The RCGM attempted to alleviate this
perceived inequality for other potentially interested parties by holding a number
of subsidiary consultative processes, including fifteen meetings in different
regions and a number of forums based on the practice of the Maori indigenous
populations. 218  Additionally, informal social practices may prevent full
participation, such as deliberative procedures that exclude individuals based on
social identities that remain unacknowledged in the deliberative process as well as
perceived incompetence about the relevant subject matter.219  Although
deliberative procedures would ideally incorporate every interested party equally,
it appears that determining the boundaries of who can participate is key to any
deliberative process.
2. Deliberative Proceduraism in Patent Law. The current patent regime resists
incorporating any of these elements. First, as noted supra, third parties are not
included during the prosecution of a patent. Moreover, current third party review
options-reexamination proceedings and inter partes reexamination
proceedings-have been subject to withering criticism because of what Robert
Merges and Joseph Farrell have termed "agenda control," which is the ability of
the inventor to control the outcome of the proceedings after the initial
submission of the potential challenger." This control over the proceedings arises
from the ability of the patent owner to strategically advance their interests
unchallenged from the beginning of the prosecution. Second, the current patent
regime is characterized by the most minimal type of engagement, as outlined by
Rowe and Frewer: public communication, in which the public, is seen as passive
democratic interests.').
217 Sally Davenport & Shirley Leitch, Agoras, Ancient andModern, anda Frameworkfor Science-Sodey
Debate, 32 SC. & PUB. POL'Y 137,147 (2005) (quoting RCGM website, http://www.gmcomnission.
govt.n2/inquiry/decsappinterestedperson_1 708.html).
218 Id. at 147-48.
219 Marian Barnes et al., Constituting 'the Public'in Public Participation, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 379, 392-93
(2003).
220 Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge andDefendPatents: Why iUtigation Won't
Rehab# Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might He45, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 943, 965-66 (2004).
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recipients of a bargain that already has been negotiated by the patent owner and
the government.
Notably, both versions of the Patent Reform Act contemplate a higher
engagement from third parties: consultative engagement. In the House version,
H.R. 2795, § 122(e) of the Patent Reform Act would allow any third party to
submit evidence of "any patent, published patent application or other publication
of potential relevance" for consideration and inclusion in a patent application
either six months after the patent is published or rejected, whichever comes first,
or before the notice of allowance."1 This submission could be accompanied by
a concise statement of its relevance. ' The Senate version, S. 3818, adopts similar
procedures as those contained in H.R.2795. 3 Additional third party submission
of the patent would presumably provide patent examiners with a better ability to
identify relevant prior art and other relevant information. Nevertheless, third
party review as contemplated by either Patent Reform Act is not fully
participatory. Argumentative discourse is significantly constrained. Contemplated
submissions can only direct the examiners to the patents, published applications,
or other relevant publications. Moreover, third parties are not allowed to respond
to any arguments made by either the patent examiner or the claimant or appeal
if the examiner fails to adequately address the submitted prior art."
Given these limitations, a number of commentators have suggested that a
truly deliberative process would be a community patent or peer review system that
uses peer review22' to fully incorporate an analysis of the person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA) into the prosecution of a patent. 1 6 A peer review
system would have the benefit of grounding a dialogic process in specific time
period. Moreover, a peer review system would identify who could participate
within the course of a given proceeding if it was undertaken by third parties with
-1 H.R. 2795 § 122(e)(1). By contrast, the current Patent Act only offers a limited opportunity
to cite relevant prior art to the examiner within the context of a potential reexamination proceeding.
See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2005).
H.R. 2795 § 122(e)(2)(A).
"2 S. 3818 § 7(e)(l).
4 H.R. 2795 § 122(e)(2); S. 3818 § 7(e)(1).
"2 Peer review of submitted articles typically consists of two levels of reviews: (1) a designated
number of referees; and (2) an editorial staff that initiates the review process. Chris Harrison, Peer
Review, Politics and Pluralism, 7 ENVTL. Sci. & POL'Y 357, 360-61 (2004) (analyzing the editorial peer
review process).
226 The most prominent project to date supporting a peer to peer patent review is the Peer to
Patent Project, which supports community review of patents. See Beth Novocek et al., 'Peer to
Patent". A Proposalfor Community Peer Review of Patents, availabk at http://peertopatent.jot.com/
WikiHome (last visited Oct. 27, 2006); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious To Whom? Evaluating
Inventions From the Perspectives of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 901 (2004) (analyzing the
impact of peer review practice on the PTO).
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relevant experience within a given field. Such an undertaking would not be seen
as a particularly onerous one. The patent examiner would simply have to publish
an outline of the likely PHOSITA. Interested participants could determine
whether they fulfill those qualifications and participate by responding to
arguments raised by the examiners. A peer review system would formally embed
the institutional commitment to a dialogic process in two significant ways. First,
a broader range of opinions would be presented to the examiner. Second, unlike
the merely consultative engagement contemplated by current patent reform, the
argumentative dialogue could actually lead to a more complete universe of
relevant information that reflects the expertise associated with a relevant
invention.
Despite these potential reforms, adopting deliberative procedures to
formalized administrative discourses faces significant barriers. As an initial
matter, the adversarial process of the law encourages "strategic interaction, to
reach a favourable outcome" so that "truth-finding is not necessarily a
cooperative but rather a competitive enterprise.""22 The model of structural
pluralism rewards these types of strategic actions, seeing this competitive
interaction as central to organizing group behavior. Additionally, administrative
discourses are inherently coercive because government agencies can bind
unwilling parties to their ultimate decisionmaking.228 Most importantly, the rules
for the argumentative structures in the administrative arena may not be as open-
ended as contemplated within a truly deliberative method. Instead, administrative
processes are characterized by a closed sequence of procedures that limit potential
parties, argumentative methods, and topics for discussions. 9  The Federal
Circuit's reluctance to allow an open-ended administrative challenge under the
APA to examination procedures points to this preference within administrative
regimes. For example, in Star Fruits,"0 the Federal Circuit, examining the
challenge of a patent applicant to an examiner's request for information, held that
a party under the APA cannot preemptively challenge the PTO's patentability
determination. In order to undertake a challenge under the APA, a patentee had
to await a statutory rejection and then litigate the propriety of the act in the
relevant administrative forum, such as the BPAI, before pursuing such an option
in district court.23' In dissent, Judge Newman noted that this requirement was
onerous to the extent that such a process "bypasses and forecloses" APA
" Peter Bal, Discourse Ethics and Human Rights in Criminal Procedure, in HABERMAS, MODERNITY
AND LAw 71, 79 (Mathieu Deflem ed., 1996).
m Id.
2Z Id
'o Star Fruits S.N.C. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 313 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
231 Id at 1284.
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procedures and would require a relevant party to undertake a costly and overly
complicated challenge to major interpretative changes made the patent
community.23 2 StarFruits creates a closed examination process, wherein potential
statutory errors cannot be corrected before grant of the patent, further limiting
agency accountability.233
. If adopted, the model of deliberative proceduralism could potentially impact
third party participation in a patent regime by emphasizing transparency as the
predominant participatory mechanism. A deliberative perspective is much more
interested in establishing the transparency of government action than a structural
pluralist model. By allowing more individuals to participate in the examination
process, a deliberative exchange may subject a patent to a more rigorous review
than from a sole patent examiner and his or her supervisors. Although patent
examiners are required to have expertise in a particular area, practitioners,
competitors, academics, and other interested parties may be more capable of
completing the reconstructive history of the relevant art necessary to determine
a patent's actual inventiveness. Indeed, a deliberative exchange would create a
more complete administrative record of a patent for a court to exercise review
under the APA. Moreover, a more transparent process would potentially
strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the PTO.
The benefits of a transparent deliberative regime, however, may negatively
affect the strengthened standing claims enjoyed in a structural pluralist regime.
While a wider number of interests may participate in a deliberative process, their
interests may be more diffuse and less concentrated on obtaining a particular
policy outcome. Given the diffuse nature of these interests, the type of standing
afforded to third parties is not very clear within the deliberative exchange. Any
type of community patent may want (much like the RCGM's efforts) to
distinguish between the types of parties within any given deliberative process. A
key revision to the third-party review contemplated by 5 122 of the Patent Reform
Act of 2005, will potentially allow a range of interests to participate as third party
submitters, but would also allow designated entities the right to apply for a "full"
status that would include a right of appeal to challenge the conclusions reached
by a patent examiner.
IV. CONCLUSION
Clarity is not always a premium during the often messy legislative process.
Including elements of both models discussed above without thinking through the
unique consequences of each model, however, may confuse rather than clarify the
232 Id. at 1286.
233 id.
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nature of third party participation in patent law. For example, if third party
review of § 122 includes a peer review patent proceeding, then a significant
question exists over whether an expanded opposition proceeding is even
necessary, given the expanded opportunity to comment during the prosecution.
Moreover, to the degree that opposition proceedings have the potential to create
stronger standing claims for third parties over the long-term, then adopting
deliberative procedures may 'not substantively increase third party participation
beyond the initial prosecution of the patent. Any patent reform must take into
account the differences between these two models and seek to clarify exactly what
type of third party participation is contemplated.
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